

Frontier Journalism in Colorado

BY DAVID F. HALAAS

In the spring of 1859 the entire country was buzzing with news of gold in the Pikes Peak region. Horace Greeley, editor of the New York *Tribune* and a long-time skeptic, came West to find out for himself whether the stories he had heard were true. What he found in Colorado he liked; and a month after his arrival he sent home glowing accounts of the riches to be found in the Rocky Mountains. Greeley's report further stimulated the onrushing hordes, and soon, in isolated mountain valleys, in forsaken gulches, in nearly dry stream beds, lusty new camps appeared. Tarryall, Hamilton, Buckskin Joe, Fairplay, Golden, Gold Hill, Boulder, Colorado City, and other towns were established in the frantic year of '59; nor was it long before these communities began to display apparent signs of permanency. Not least among these signs was the growth of newspapers; indeed, as soon as the town saloon was erected, a newspaper came forth to hail the camp as a veritable "Hartford of the West."

The Cherry Creek country could boast of a newspaper soon after the arrival early in 1859 of William Newton Byers, a sometime surveyor, who had come from Omaha "with his shirt tail full of type," accompanied by Dr. George C. Monell and Thomas Gibson, a printer from Fontanelle, Nebraska.¹ Byers left Omaha in March with an old printing press, "the relic of a starved to death newspaper,"² and with high hopes of setting up the first paper in the mining region. Hurrying on to Denver, Byers discovered that another press, belonging to one Jack Merrick, had already arrived. Both papers got to press on the evening of

¹ William N. Byers, "The Newspaper Press of Colorado," p. 3, Bancroft Scrap, Western Historical Collections, University of Colorado Library, Boulder (photostatic copy). Hereafter cited as Byers, "Newspaper Press."

² *Ibid.*, 3-4.

April 23, 1859, "but a self-constituted committee that vibrated actively between the two offices decided that the *News* was victorious by about twenty minutes."³ Merrick's *Cherry Creek Pioneer* was not only second in the race, but it was also decidedly inferior in quality when compared to Byers' sheet, the *Rocky Mountain News*. Seeing that his future in the newspaper business held little promise, Merrick gazed longingly at the mountains, sold his press and type to Byers for thirty dollars' worth of provisions, and set out to pick gold instead of type.⁴

Even if Merrick were through, his press was destined to enjoy a long and illustrious career. Thomas Gibson carted the press up to Gregory Gulch where, on July 1, 1859, he printed the first issue of the *Rocky Mountain Gold Reporter*. After remaining in Mountain City for five months, the wandering press found its way down to Golden City where a Boston company used it to establish the *Western Mountaineer*.⁵ With the demise of that paper, the now tired but still willing press moved on to southern Colorado where it paused long enough in Canon City to give birth to the *Canon City Times*. In the spring of 1862 the *Times* was prosperous enough to purchase a newer and bigger press, and once again the old Merrick press moved, this time to the rough and ready mining camp of Buckskin Joe in South Park. After competing for a short time with the nearby *Miners' Record*, printed in Tarryall, the press made yet another trip and came to rest in the town of Valmont. While in Valmont it printed the *Boulder Valley News* for a short time; but apparently the *News* angered certain Boulder County citizens, and the old press was "kidnapped" and taken to Boulder where it was again placed into operation, but to produce a "more acceptable" news-sheet called the *Boulder County News*. Finally the wandering press was sold to a publisher in Elizabeth, New Mexico, and perhaps there it found a well-deserved rest.

It would seem, then, that even if the gold fields were primitive, even if they were filled with violence and lawlessness,

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Merrick's new vocation proved to be no more successful than his abortive attempt in the newspaper business. After going broke digging gold, he returned to Denver where he spent some time on Byers' staff. Later he served in an Illinois volunteer regiment during the Civil War, and when mustered out, he returned to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, joined a veteran regiment, and was finally killed in a street riot near the end of the war. Byers, "Newspaper Press," *passim*.

⁵ The *Western Mountaineer* (Golden) was favored with a brilliant staff. For example, Albert D. Richardson later became famous as a staff man for the *New York Tribune*, and Thomas Knox was to gain national recognition as an author and world traveler. Edwin A. Bemis, "Journalism in Colorado," *Colorado and Its People*, ed. LeRoy R. Hafen (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Co., Inc., 1948), II, 252-54.

they were nonetheless open to journalistic efforts, and legitimate as well as not-so-legitimate newspapermen tried their luck at editing local newsheets. Not every attempt was successful, however. A would-be editor faced certain conditions in a mining camp which were entirely unknown back in the States. And as long as the circumstances of publishing remained primitive and rough, the papers, regardless of time or place, faced similar problems. Since they were founded under similar conditions, most of them offered nearly identical reasons for their establishment.

The *Rocky Mountain News* issued a prospectus in April, 1859, in which it carefully and painstakingly justified its existence. Noting that it would be conducted with entire independence of all partisan or pecuniary considerations, the *News*



1860.—EDITORIAL ROOM OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS.

went on to promise its readers that it would be "devoted thoroughly to Western interests."⁶ In particular, the *News* emphasized that its reading material would invariably be useful to the stranger "in forming a correct estimate of the Mining Region

⁶ See the *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), April 23, 1859.

and its prospects: either for Mining, Farming or Trading. . . .⁷⁷ Fearful that some inhabitants of Denver might underestimate its worth, the *News* pointed out that it was the intention of the editor to make Denver's first journal "the best newspaper in the country."⁷⁸ Apparently the editor perceived little interest among his readers for national news and stated that "there is neither time or place for those discussions which interest older and organized communities. The local matters of the mining regions will be abundantly sufficient. . . ."⁷⁹

In similar terms, the *Tri-Weekly Miners' Register*, issued out of Central City, announced that it would recommend itself to those who wished to make known the wealth and prosperity of Central's mining regions to interested parties back East, as well as to those persons in the States who wished to keep posted on the progress of operations in "the great gold fields of the

The Tri-Weekly Miners' Register became successively the Daily Miners' Register, the Daily Register, and the Daily Register-Call.



Rocky Mountains."¹⁰ Because the mining regions of Central City needed foreign capital, the *Register* declared that it would aid in publicizing the rich mineral resources of the mountains by collecting and publishing reliable statistics in regard to the yield of the various lodes and gulches.¹¹ Unlike the *Rocky Mountain News*, the *Register* did not disclaim the importance of eastern news, stating that it proposed "to furnish the dwellers in these mountains the very latest news from the East."¹² Ending on an optimistic note, the paper proclaimed its intention of "making our paper a *Register* of the valuable items relative to the mines, our agricultural prospects, and business prosperity."¹³

The prospectus of the *Canon City Times* declared its devotion to the interests of the southern mines and Canon City. "The columns of the *Times* will contain the very latest news—political, commercial, foreign and home, besides choice literary selections."¹⁴ Assuring its readers that it would give reliable correspondence from the mines and interesting letters from the States, it was at the same time quick to point out that these items would be brief,¹⁵ and that the main purpose of the paper would be local rather than national. In short, the paper was to be a faithful journal of the improvement and prosperity of Canon City.¹⁶

One common problem facing the early Colorado journals was that of finding subscribers. The *Canon City Times* told its readers in no uncertain terms that if a home paper was to be supported, home influence must do it; indeed, every dollar sent to eastern news sheets was at the expense of the local paper.¹⁷ Later, when the *Times* purchased a new press for twenty-five hundred dollars, it renewed its cry for subscribers: "All we ask of our citizens is a generous support of our undertaking."¹⁸

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Tri-Weekly Miners' Register* (Central City), July 25, 1863.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Canon City Times*, September 15, 1860. The *Times* was very proud of the fact that the Republican nominee for President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, was on its list of subscribers.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ For similar justifications see the *Colorado Miner* (Georgetown), June 6, 1867; *Colorado Chieftain* (Pueblo), June 1, 1866; *Saguache Chronicle*, April 15, 1876; *Colorado Transcript* (Golden), December 19, 1866; *Out West* (Colorado Springs), March 23, 1872. See also D. W. Working, "Some Forgotten Pioneer Newspapers," *The Colorado Magazine*, IV (May, 1927), 93-100.

¹⁷ *Canon City Times*, September 29, 1860. The *Times* was not, however, proposing that westerners divorce themselves from all eastern influences; it was only pointing out that the bulk of support for a local paper must come from its own region.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, December 15, 1860.

The *Boulder County News* was no less insistent. Boulderites should patronize their town paper because it was "a mining and agricultural newspaper" devoted to their interests and catering to local and regional news.¹⁹ The *Colorado Springs Weekly Gazette* went further; it not only made the usual plea for public support, but it also even defined the phrase "public help." To this press, patronage was the abstention from criticism and faultfinding, especially "that kind behind our backs, or hints as to how a newspaper ought to be conducted; these we can supply to ourselves in abundance."²⁰ What it did want was substantial support in the way of subscribers and advertisers. In addition, all those persons acquainted with the paper should recommend it to those "unaware of our enterprise."²¹ The *Gazette* reminded its patrons that, after all, it had been established at the earliest possible time without "positive less [sic]" to the editors.²² If it was to conform to its original purpose, the public must take an active interest in it and help it to prosper.²³

If obtaining subscribers was a problem common to all papers, so too was the problem of finding news-worthy items to publish. Most of the early papers complained bitterly of the scarcity of local color stories—at least those which could be printed. "We dislike to hear people kicking about dull times when we take the time to rustle a fat local paper every day," grumbled the *Telluride Evening News*.²⁴ Even Golden's lively *Western Mountaineer* on occasion complained of "dull times." After describing "our fix," the paper advised all would-be newspapermen never to "take up the reporting trade for a livelihood. It's a business that will do in times of murder but in dull times it's a humbug."²⁵ Sometimes the papers tossed off all convention and simply printed the terse statement that "news are scarce" and let it go at that.²⁶

Dull times notwithstanding, some readers still found their local sheet mundane in the extreme, and often referred to it as "our poor paper." Accordingly, many subscribers refused to honor their pledges, and the problem of collection was almost

¹⁹ *Boulder County News*, October 12, 1869; see also October 19, 1869.

²⁰ *Colorado Springs Weekly Gazette*, January 4, 1873.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Evening News* (Telluride), July 22, 1884.

²⁵ *Western Mountaineer* (Golden), March 7, 1860.

²⁶ See, for example, the *Daily Mining Journal* (Black Hawk), November 30, 1863; *Tri-Weekly Miners' Register* (Central City), August 4, 1862; and the *San Miguel Journal*, February 4, 1882, in "Miscellaneous Newspapers," State Historical Society of Colorado Library (microfilm).

OFFICE OF
Colorado Miner,
 GEORGETOWN, COLORADO.

Dear Sir:

The time for which the MINER to your address has been paid, will expire in one month; see date on printed address. Shall we continue the paper? We can promise that it shall be fully up to the standard of the past year, and we hope to make it even more worthy of your patronage. As we prepay the postage without adding the amount to the subscription price, it is the same as deducting it from it; so that while you will be getting a better paper, it will not cost you as much as usual.

Yours, with great respect,

Cree J. Patterson

universal. In Boulder, the *County News* had had its fill of men who always found it convenient to be "away on business" when collection time rolled around. "We do think that these men would show more enterprise by settling with the printer. A printing office is a poor place to get your name up unless you pay for it. We are liable at any time to give your names a place in our list of 'dead beats.' In short settle up, or we will be compelled to erase your names. The last call."²⁷ Unfortunately the "dead beats" were slow to respond, and several weeks later the editor was forced to notify his readers that no paper would be delivered to a subscriber unless he paid cash for it in advance.²⁸ Those who promise and then renege, cried the *County News* in a last parting shot, are "low, mean, degrading and contemptible."²⁹ Another paper, the *Colorado Chieftain*, timidly and apologeti-

²⁷ *Boulder County News* (Boulder), December 14, 1869.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, December 28, 1869.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

cally announced that it would bring the printed word to Pueblo, even though settlers in a new country were backward about contributing to the support of public enterprises and improvements.³⁰ In Georgetown, the *Colorado Miner* printed a story about an editor who became "martial" and was commissioned a captain in the army. On parade, instead of shouting "two paces in front—advance," the former editor unconsciously bawled out: "Cash—two dollars a year—advance!"³¹

Every editor had to contend with his public, and if he printed a controversial story, he had to be willing to face certain hazards. One contemporary letter writer described Denver in 1860 as a place "infested with hoards of villains of the blackest dye, thieves and blacklegs of all kinds. It appears to be an asylum for renegades and outlaws from all the surrounding regions. . . . But what better can we expect in a community without laws?"³² William Byers, editor of the *Rocky Mountain News*, had the misfortune to witness the behavior of these "villains of the blackest dye" firsthand. In July, 1860, Charley Harrison, a sometime barkeeper and full-time villain, deliberately shot and killed a Negro. Byers, writing in the *News*, denounced Harrison in firm and biting terms, and Harrison, undoubtedly feeling wronged, rounded up members of his notorious gang and attacked the paper's office. There they found the shaken editor and forcibly removed him to Harrison's Criterion Saloon, where they prepared to hang him. Luckily, Harrison had a change of heart, and during a lull in the festivities he slipped Byers out the back door. But those in Harrison's gang, by now reeling under the "influence," were not to be easily put off. After they discovered that Byers was no longer in the saloon, they set out at once to recapture him. When they finally located him in his office, they found that this time Byers and his small staff were fully armed. Somewhat disappointed,



they milled about outside, waiting for someone with the courage—or bravado—to storm the office alone. They had not long to wait. One George Steel, armed not so much with courage as with liquor, rode his horse directly in front of the *News* office and sent a shot in the general direction of the crouching newspapermen. His fire was returned and Steel was somehow wounded. At this point, some Denver citizens became aroused and finally mounted up and galloped after the crippled Steel. After a short but dramatic chase, Steel was captured, and, in typical vigilante fashion, justice was speedily effected.³³ When the smoke cleared, Byers was surprisingly reluctant to publicize the episode. He did, however, feel called upon to note that he fully appreciated "the personal danger of our position. Our life may pay the forfeit of our temerity, yet we shall not shrink from what we conceive to be our duty."³⁴

There were other problems, less dangerous than simply annoying. For example, the *Colorado Springs Weekly Gazette* was no sooner founded when it was approached by a member of the town council. The councilman wondered whether the *Gazette* might insert "a line or two" in the paper's next issue reminding the fire warden that certain "parties" were not zealously obeying the newly-inaugurated ashpit ordinance. With that obliging disposition which always characterized the frontier press, the *Gazette* agreed to place a small article in the forthcoming issue—at its own expense. But the paper was in for a disagreeable surprise. When the fire warden read the "line or two" he promptly strode over to the paper's office and presented the editor with a summons to "appear somewhere & pay over to the Town Trustees the sum of ten dollars & costs, for neglecting the ordinance about ashpits. Now is there anybody else who wants us to write about anything. We are quite ready. It's a kind of work that is expensive; but, then, it's exciting."³⁵ To

³⁰ *Colorado Chieftain* (Pueblo), June 1, 1868.

³¹ *Colorado Miner* (Georgetown), December 26, 1867.

³² Sidney B. Morrison, "Letters from Colorado, 1860-1863," *The Colorado Magazine*, XVI (May, 1939), 92. See also the diary of A. T. Rankin, State Historical Society of Colorado Library.

³³ For more details see Rankin's diary; Susan P. Ashley, "Reminiscences of Colorado in the Early 'Sixties," *The Colorado Magazine*, XIII (November, 1936), 219-30; *Rocky Mountain Herald* (Denver), August 1, 1860; Orando J. Hollister, *The Mines of Colorado* (Springfield, Mass.: Samuel Bowles & Co., 1867), p. 95; Frank Hall, *History of the State of Colorado* (Chicago: The Blakely Printing Co., 1889), III, 134-35; and Jerome C. Smiley, *History of Denver* (Denver: The Times-Sun Publishing Co., 1901), 345-47. For a more recent account see Robert L. Perkin, *The First Hundred Years: An Informal History of Denver and the Rocky Mountain News* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 165 ff.

³⁴ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), August 1, 1860.

³⁵ *Colorado Springs Weekly Gazette*, January 18, 1873.

the *Gazette* the fine was a gross violation of the rules of fair play. So, in accordance with the finest traditions of newspapering, the paper mustered all its crusading zeal and campaigned to right what it called a "public wrong." Since the fine was a "public matter" by definition, the editor pointed out that "he has as much right to comment upon it as upon any other act of public injustice."³⁶ If the paper thought that by exposing the fire warden's vile act it would thereby bring the community to correct the situation, it was sadly mistaken. For all its grumblings, the paper failed to arouse public sympathy and the ten-dollar fine was not suspended.

Apart from incidences where a reader might take exception to an article, the local papers apparently aroused little interest as a prime source of news. The *Canon City Times* observed that "a communication which is a fourth of a column long is read by most readers . . . ; over half a column long is read by half our readers; a column long by a third of them; a two column article by one tenth; a three or four column one by nobody whatever, except this weary editor and his proof reader. . . ."³⁷

Despite a strongly-voiced desire at the outset for a local journal, reader interest turned more to eastern news and, in particular, to letters and publications from the home town back in the States. One miner said it this way: "The few things that serve to arouse us, to anything like excitement, is the weekly arrival of mails from the east. . . ."³⁸ Pioneer diaries constantly made reference to "mail day," or "today the mail arrives."³⁹ National news, preferably from such a journal as the *New York Tribune*, was read avidly; news of the national political scene was, however, a subject of lesser interest. A *Central City* miner allowed that while "the people here are from all parts of the States [I] hear nothing about politics out here as evry body [*sic*] is for money and not for office. . . ."⁴⁰

If the early newspapers evoked little enthusiasm as local news organs, one may wonder why most frontier journals were for a time at least moderately successful. The answer to this seeming paradox was the general belief that a local paper, by presenting a favorable image of the community to the outside

³⁶ *Ibid.*, January 25, 1873.

³⁷ *Canon City Times*, November 3, 1860.

³⁸ Robert G. Athearn (ed.), "Life in the Pikes Peak Region: The Letters of Matthew H. Dale," *The Colorado Magazine*, XXXII (April, 1955), 92.

³⁹ See the diary of Ella Bailey, March 18, 1869, State Historical Society of Colorado Library, and the diary of H. S. Hawley, December 8, 1860, *Western Historical Collections*, University of Colorado Library, Boulder.

⁴⁰ Diary of H. S. Hawley, August 8, 1860.

world, could attract people and capital. Serving in a sense as a local chamber of commerce, it therefore deserved public support. The local journals were from the beginning fully aware of their mission in this regard. The *Colorado Chieftain* explained it this way: "We want immigration, and we want capital. This we have to induce by diffusing such information as will show people outside of our Territory the advantage of coming here and investing; in other words, *we must advertise ourselves.*"⁴¹



The *Chieftain* went on to propose that it serve as Pueblo's advertising medium; it would be the city's "mouthpiece and engine of future progress."⁴² The *Canon City Times* was even more explicit. In one of its numerous pleas for support, it reminded its readers that the *Times* had been a "faithful gazette of city life—chronicling its pleasure, its business, and its growth and improvements. This has been its course, and while receiving favor at home, it has won golden opinions abroad, and given to our beautiful city a notoriety it otherwise would not have

⁴¹ *Colorado Chieftain* (Pueblo), June 1, 1868.

⁴² *Ibid.*

had."⁴³ The public should support its local paper, said the *Times*, because "a paper is the representative and reflection of the place in which it is published, and it is through its columns that the world learns of your rise and fall."⁴⁴

Accordingly, much of the news space in the pioneer press was devoted to articles, editorials, and correspondence pointing to, or extolling, the virtues of the locale in which it was published. The *Colorado Transcript* felt that it was not saying too much for it to assert that Golden's advantage "as to her contiguity to the mines, and to all the mineral wealth that goes to build up a town . . . are second to none in Colorado."⁴⁵ Spirited competition developed between papers in which each attempted to outdo the other in picturing the advantages of its own locale. It could be expected that many papers overstated their case. But woe to any newsheet that underrated the potential wealth of the region! For example, the *Saguache Chronicle* printed an article in which it contended that the area surrounding Saguache was suitable for grazing 1,500 sheep and cattle. Luckily the *Chronicle* itself caught the error—it had meant to say that 15,000 could be comfortably handled, and this mistake, opined the *Chronicle*, "if not corrected would lead our distant readers to infer that the pasturage of our country was extremely limited, when in fact we have one of the best grazing counties in the state."⁴⁶ Just to make sure that there was no mistake about it, the paper told its readers that the figure of 20,000 was probably too low.⁴⁷

No topic was too mundane, no advantage too petty; if the town was blessed with an advantage, the papers wrote about it. One notified its subscribers that asthmatics and sufferers from bronchitis and similar affections could rely upon almost complete relief so long as they remained in the territory—and especially if they remained near the town paper.⁴⁸ The same paper felt called upon to announce that Colorado's sunsets were far superior to any in the East: "Even on the clearest days clouds almost invariably gather round the whole horizon, shortly before the sun goes down, and form an encircling belt of gorgeous color."⁴⁹ That the paper exaggerated must have been

obvious to readers of the *Caribou Post*. This paper observed that Caribou was assuming a much more lively appearance and that mining was expanding on all fronts. In the same issue, however, the editor noted that at present he was suspending operations of the *Post*. He allowed that while the value of the mining in and around Caribou had shown everything that could reasonably be expected of it, all things considered, "its development has not been as rapid as we had reason to hope and expect, and we have consequently been unable to make at present a financial success."⁵⁰

A technique continuously used by the papers to draw the attention of eastern readers was to directly address likely immigrants. The *Western Mountaineer* told easterners that it would not advise them to come West—this must be their own decision. But to those who had already decided, it wished to point out that they were not coming to a wild and desolate country; rather they were coming to a region rich in soil where "thousands upon thousands of acres of land" only awaited the magic touch of the farmer.⁵¹ Similarly, the *Black Hawk Daily Mining Journal* declared that the Black Hawk region had the materials for doing double the business accomplished. Five thousand good lodes were probably traced and recorded in Gilpin and Clear Creek Counties, and yet, said the *Journal*, only fifty were worked.⁵² And the *Colorado Miner*, issued out of Georgetown, finding itself unable to print adequate amounts of news, appealed to any and all local men of letters to send in correspondence relative to the wealth of the diggings: "We want to do all in our power," it said, "to spread knowledge of the extent and wealth of our mineral fields."⁵³ As far as it could tell, however, it was sure that the Georgetown mines exceeded anything yet discovered in the world.⁵⁴

Although the most common references related to the boundless resources of the West, enterprising editors often used other means to gain the attention of their readers. The *Fort Collins Standard* apprised easterners of the fact that Fort Collins had four of the best hotels in Colorado, and that they were making extensive arrangements for the expected large immigration.⁵⁵ The *Standard* also observed that the future of Fort Collins was

⁴³ *Canon City Times*, January 12, 1861; see also the *Brush Lariat*, May 10, 1884.

⁴⁴ *Canon City Times*, January 12, 1861.

⁴⁵ *Colorado Transcript* (Golden), December 19, 1866.

⁴⁶ *Saguache Chronicle*, August 5, 1876.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Out West* (Colorado Springs), May 16, 1872.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, August 15, 1872.

⁵⁰ *Caribou Post*, August 17, 1871.

⁵¹ *Western Mountaineer* (Golden), December 14, 1859.

⁵² *Daily Mining Journal* (Black Hawk), January 13, 1864.

⁵³ *Colorado Miner* (Georgetown), June 27, 1867.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, June 20, 1867.

⁵⁵ *Fort Collins Standard*, March 18, 1874.

more flattering than ever before.⁵⁶ Not forgetting that sex was a strong motivating force, the *Western Mountaineer* directed an appeal to the hearts of the male readers. Golden was favored, it declared, with an unusual number of beautiful ladies, and "nearly every evening the sound of merry voices, and nimble feet is heard issuing from some one of the happy houses of our city. . . ."⁵⁷ As to what it meant by "houses" probably stirred the blood of several curious males.

As an aid to those whose coming to the West was imminent, most papers reported the condition of the roads and the most convenient avenues of departure from the East. The *Rocky Mountain News* cautioned the gold-seekers to wait until the spring snows had passed. After all, gold was plentiful in the Cherry Creek country, and just as much of it would be waiting for them in good weather as in bad.⁵⁸ In view of the fact that numerous correspondents wrote in from all parts of the United States asking for information about Colorado, the journals, with very little urging, answered their questions in the papers. The *Saguache Chronicle* told these correspondents to "subscribe for the *Chronicle*, and we will answer your questions through it."⁵⁹

No matter how much the papers might address their columns to their "eastern friends," their reports were of little avail if their messages failed to reach the intended parties. To facilitate communication which would do the job, many papers appealed to "enterprising subscribers" to send extra copies back East. The *Fort Collins Standard* was particularly active in this regard. It boldly announced that single copies of the *Standard*, in wrappers ready for mailing, could be procured at its office for five cents—half the usual cost.⁶⁰ The *Out West* hoped that it would not only find its way into nearly every home in the county, but also that many of its public-spirited men would make a point of sending scores of copies back to the States.⁶¹ By this means, the paper declared, they would contribute materially to the prosperity of the community in which they had cast their lot.⁶² The *Canon City Times* was of a similar mind. Noting that it mailed 150 copies of every issue back East, the *Times* nevertheless felt the number should be tripled if it was to influence spring immigration.⁶³

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, March 11, 1874.

⁵⁷ *Western Mountaineer* (Golden), December 14, 1859.

⁵⁸ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), June 18, 1859.

⁵⁹ *Saguache Chronicle*, April 22, 1876.

⁶⁰ *Fort Collins Standard*, April 15, 1874.

⁶¹ *Out West* (Colorado Springs), December 26, 1872.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Canon City Times*, February 16, 1861.

But public-spirited men were willing to spend their money on such ventures only if the papers could boast of a large circulation. Thus, the papers took great pains to show the extent and numbers of their subscribers. In Denver, the *News* proudly announced, in April, 1860, that it already had a circulation in every state of the Union "save two," and in all the territories and both the Canadas.⁶⁴ Moreover it was forwarded by express



"every Thursday morning, and received by its subscribers everywhere with the utmost regularity."⁶⁵ Just a month later, the paper revealed that it now printed over 2,000 per issue, and it supposed that for each paper there were at least ten readers. Armed with these figures, the *News* confidently boasted that it reached the eyes of 20,000 people, an item for advertisers to consider carefully.⁶⁶

As previously noted, early Colorado papers made it clear at their inception that publicizing the West, and especially the home locale, would be a major function—indeed, a principal reason for existence. To the founders this declared purpose had the twin virtues of appearing to be altruistic as well as

⁶⁴ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), April 25, 1860.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, May 16, 1860. See also the *Colorado Republican* (Denver), March 26, 1862, and James Owen, "Reminiscences of Early Pueblo," *The Colorado Magazine*, XXII (May, 1945), 106. Owen observed that during its early years the *Colorado Chieftain* had a circulation of about three or four hundred in Pueblo and about the same number throughout southern and western Colorado.

good business. Since advertising accounted for the bulk of the paper's revenue,⁶⁷ the early press went all out to gain merchant approval. And what better way to accomplish this than to encourage immigration? The merchant was content only if he could sell his goods, and to sell his goods he needed a cash-carrying populace. To secure that market, he needed his spokesman, his propaganda agency, and the town merchant quickly perceived that by investing in his local paper he was advancing his own business and welfare. But he had to be sure of a fair return on that investment; he must be certain that the journal he sponsored was not offensive to significant parts of the reading public, notably those outside the territory. If this occurred, his own economic position in the community was bound to suffer along with that of the paper. What the businessman looked for in a paper was its ability to advertise the town and its people, and any paper that sought success had to engage in a certain amount of self-imposed censorship.

Seldom, then, did the frontier journals indulge in the luxury of editorializing about the seamier side of frontier living. That red light districts existed in the mining camps and in frontier towns is undeniable, and yet the newspapers were singularly reluctant to expose them. It would hardly help the community's image, and it most decidedly would not attract the more permanent settlers. No doubt this must have rankled the soul of many a fiery newspaper editor. A sensational story was an easy way to enliven the day's news. But the paper had an obligation, a duty to show the world that its town was civilized and suitable for respectable families. The *Colorado Chieftain* reluctantly admitted that Pueblo's reputation for decency was somewhat low. It quickly pointed out, however, that "all this is greatly exaggerated," and while there was room for improvement, the morality of Pueblo would bear favorable comparison with any town of similar age and component material. "It is certainly better," the paper hotly asserted, "than that Eastern village where honest people have to take their doorsteps in at night, for in Pueblo no one need ever lock his door for fear of robbery."⁶⁸ A parallel reluctance to crusade against evil was displayed by the *Rocky Mountain News*. After celebrating its first anniversary, the *News* recalled that it had reported, in its

very first issue, a story of a murder in Denver even though it "went forth to the world that a crime had been committed in our fair city. It was with pain that we gave the sad intelligence, but we are proud to announce that the man accused of the murder, John Scudder, is now vindicated of all guilt."⁶⁹

In Black Hawk, the *Daily Mining Journal* well understood the importance of advertisers, and comported itself accordingly. In fact, the paper was more of an advertising sheet than anything else. Out of a total of twenty-six columns, the paper devoted no less than eighteen to advertising.⁷⁰ And the Black Hawk newsheet was not exceptional in its format. The *Saguache Chronicle* dedicated fully one-half of its columns to the business houses of the city,⁷¹ while the *Out West*, in Colorado Springs, allowed merchants the use of one-third of its available space.⁷² So much did the *Rocky Mountain News* practice the art of admanship that it published for a short time the *Denver Bulletin and Supplement to the Rocky Mountain News*, a sheet which was distributed free of cost among the newly-arrived residents of Denver. "The *Bulletin* will be distributed free of cost," said the *News*, "and our only compensation will be from advertisers who will no doubt reap many fold, the small investment made."⁷³

But at least one paper failed to achieve the support of local businesses. Although the *Boulder County News* promised to furnish the residents of Boulder a newspaper that they need not be ashamed to send to their friends in the East,⁷⁴ it was unable to develop sufficient advertising support. In despair and bitterness, the paper angrily reminded the town merchants that a newspaper, by enhancing the value of property in its neighborhood and giving the locality a reputation abroad, benefited all—especially the merchants. Unfortunately for the *County News*, the reminder was of no avail. Soon it found that it could not fill all its columns, and it printed in the open space the following statement: "These two columns devoted to the interests of the poor."⁷⁵ That the editor was disgusted was readily apparent

⁶⁹ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), April 25, 1860.

⁷⁰ *Daily Mining Journal* (Black Hawk), November 20, 1863-June 14, 1864; see especially December 12, 1863.

⁷¹ *Saguache Chronicle*, vol. II (1876), *passim*.

⁷² *Out West* (Colorado Springs), vol. I (1872), *passim*.

⁷³ *Bulletin and Supplement to the Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), May 2, 1860. Byers remarked that the *Bulletin* was aimed solely at the immigrants then in Denver, but that it was sent abroad by the public-spirited men of Denver to show that Denver was a thriving business community. It was published for only a short time, however, probably because the *News* itself was adequate for this purpose. See Byers, "Newspaper Press," p. 11.

⁷⁴ *Boulder County News* (Boulder), October 12, 1869.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, February 1, 1870.

⁶⁷ See the *Tri-Weekly Miners' Register* (Central City), July 28, 1862. The *Register* enumerated three sources of revenue for a newspaper: subscriptions, which were least profitable, job-printing, and advertising.

⁶⁸ *Colorado Chieftain* (Pueblo), June 25, 1868.

when, in the next issue, he cried that "the most unhappy man in this world is a county editor. He receives the kicks and cuffs, slaps and sneers of those whom he works the hardest to please. Can you pen an article for the press? No. Can you see any good of a sound article because it contains none of your slang? No. Can you report a common public meeting? No. But you can find fault, can't you? Yes."⁷⁶ No wonder. The *County News*, instead of projecting a favorable image abroad, instead of unreservedly complimenting Boulder and its citizens, had proceeded to find fault with its patrons. It admonished them for their lack of good faith, for their failure to pay up when subscription rates were due, for their excessive drinking habits, and for their boorish manners. Rather than entertaining the home folk, the paper attempted to report the day's activities as they happened, even those which could hardly be termed respectable.⁷⁷ As a result, the merchants refused to support the editorial position of the *County News*, and it was not until the old editor resigned that the paper became firmly established in the community.⁷⁸

The experience of the Boulder *County News* indicates that to be successful, the early Colorado journals had to be effective organs for publicizing the wealth and prosperity of their respective regions. At the same time they somehow had to entertain, inform, and enliven their readers without unduly broadcasting the more compromising facets of town life. Western papers might periodically campaign to eradicate the more apparent evils of frontier living, but they had to proceed cautiously and discreetly.

There can be no doubt that while the frontier settlement was in its "boom or bust" stage, its newspaper was anything but a free agent; indeed, almost immediately following its first publication, it turned to the businessmen for aid and comfort. A frontier newspaper might possess enthusiasm, zeal, and zest, but it certainly did not possess cash. Since the business community did, and since the success of both was entirely dependent upon the growth and prosperity of the town, the merchants subsidized, at least for a time, the local paper. The merchants needed an advertising medium, a mouthpiece, to publicize their own wares and the wares of their region, while the newspaper

needed a generous support of its enterprise in order to stay alive. Both desired, above all things, a healthy and heavy influx of peoples into their particular locality. So an alliance between them was quickly effected: the newspaper informed and educated prospective immigrants as to the advantages of western life, and the merchants zealously protected the paper by extending to it substantial financial aid. Only later, after the town grew and prospered, did the newspaper become less an instrument of the merchant class and more an independent agent.

As a result, Colorado's early press did not accurately and truthfully reflect the town and people it purported to represent. Far too often the papers were concerned solely with the serious business of attracting immigration, of demonstrating that life in a mining camp or back-country hamlet was not as rough and lawless as the easterner was conditioned to believe. While this necessarily meant that a few papers were mighty dull at times, the Colorado frontiersman did find the time to read them. As one journal put it: "Our paper is read everywhere. Many read it for love, some for spite, but all want to read. . . ."⁷⁹ The printed word has a magic all its own, and the frontiersman had only too few chances to taste this magic. The easterner too was charmed—charmed both by the timeless American desire to "Go West," and by the spirited messages contained within the early Colorado press. Whether "for love or for spite," frontier journalism survived.

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⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, February 15, 1870.

⁷⁷ See, for example, *ibid.*, October 19, 1869; October 26, 1869; November 30, 1869; December 28, 1869; and January 4, 1870.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, April 5, 1870.

⁷⁹ *Colorado Democrat* (Golden), March 3, 1863.



"For These High Purposes"

BY VIRGINIA McCONNELL

When the architect of the Colorado State Capitol submitted his plans for its design, he observed: "The style of architecture for a public building should be suited to the building itself, and the purposes for which it is intended to be used. Where laws are to be enacted for the government of a great State, public records preserved, and accommodations provided for the executive and judiciary branches of government, the character of the building should be such as would command respect for these high purposes. . . ."¹

But in the first decades territorial, state, county, and city governments in Denver had to make do with buildings scarcely suitable for their purposes, much less commanding of respect. It was a mighty step, and a hard-won step, when the State of

Colorado created a capitol of true dignity. It was an even mightier step when the City and County of Denver undertook to complement the Capitol with a beautiful civic center. Not all of the plan was fulfilled, and much that has been added since by both governments has been expedient and fragmentary, detracting in some instances from the over-all aesthetic effect. Nevertheless, Denver today remains possessed of a handsome, spacious capitol and civic center complex of which it can justifiably be proud. The story of its evolution is as varied as were the immediate needs, jealousies, selfish desires, ambitions, and dreams of the people who created it, past and present.

The territorial government met wherever it could borrow or rent rooms in saloons, stores, or warehouses around Denver. One early session of the legislature adjourned to Colorado City but found accommodations there even less adequate. Then in 1862 Golden City, almost as large as Denver and its chief rival, succeeded in wresting the legislature away from Denver and kept it until 1867. The executive offices remained in Denver except when Governor Alexander Cummings won a fight to move his officials to Golden, too.

Not only had Denver lost its shaky role as capital during those years, but its city government also suffered tribulations. Not the least of these was caused by the 1864 Cherry Creek flood which swept away the city hall and all its records. Henceforth, city offices were forced to occupy various rented quarters, until the new city hall on Larimer and Fourteenth was completed in 1883.² This hall was used for a fire station after the city government moved to the City and County Building in 1932.³

County offices existed in a similar fashion until the Court House uptown was completed in 1883.⁴ As early as 1875 the county had been interested in purchasing the lots at Fourteenth and Larimer, which became the City Hall site; but real estate promoters and other citizens successfully agitated in favor of a block on the "outskirts" of town—land bounded by Court Place, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Tremont. Constructed from plans by Elijah E. Myers of Detroit, this building also furnished room for the collections of the State Historical and Natural

¹ Colorado, Board of Capitol Managers, *Second Biennial Report: 1886*, E. E. Myers' description of the Colorado State Capitol, p. 66.

² Jerome C. Smiley, *History of Denver* (Denver: The Times-Sun Publishing Co., 1901), p. 647.

³ Torn down in 1950, the site now is a parking lot in what was formerly the center of municipal activity.

⁴ Smiley, *History of Denver*, p. 541.

History Society, which had been organized in 1879.⁵ When the City and County of Denver completed its new building, the county offices moved to it.⁶

At the time of the construction of the building at Court Place, the *Denver Tribune* wrote:

Nothing cheap and nasty is wanted by the Centennial State. Our new Court house, when finished will not cost as much as many Eastern county buildings found in towns of less than five thousand people. But it was made plain and cheap with the understanding that our money was to be lavished upon the State house, and that it was to be the crowning pride of the city. . . . Last winter the Legislature appropriated five thousand dollars to be used in ornamenting the Capitol grounds as soon as the Supreme court decided that H. C. Brown had no title to them . . . [but] for some unexplained reason the State authorities have done nothing. It is time to begin.⁷

Indeed, the state, officially constituted as such in 1876, still had no capitol building, nor was it to have a totally completed structure until 1908. The story of the long delay is one of rivalry among the various sections of the territory and of litigation between land donors and the state.

When the territorial government moved back to Denver in 1867, amid angry complaints from Golden's citizenry, Henry C. Brown's donation of ten acres for a capitol site was a major inducement. The land given was the two blocks on which the Capitol stands today between Colfax and Fourteenth, Grant and Lincoln.

Henry Cordes Brown had come to Denver in 1860, intending to go on to California; however, he and his bride liked the location of the new settlement of Denver so much that they went no farther. Brown, a builder and carpenter, took up his trade there. In 1862 he pre-empted 160 acres on what became known as Brown's Bluff, a strip one mile long by one-fourth mile wide, running north and south; the Browns built a home on the land near Twelfth and Sherman Streets.⁸ It has been said that Brown's purpose in giving two blocks of this property to the territory was to secure permission from the city to plat the bluff with a north-south axis (unlike the northeast axis of the older section of town) and to increase the value of the total holding.⁹ In deeding the land in January, 1868, Brown

required that the parcel be used for a capitol site.

Such a gift alone did not assure the erection of a building, for the territory's funds were too limited to proceed and the location of the capital city still was hotly contested. But several other individuals, including Samuel and Mary Browne, John Evans, Simeon Whiteley, Caleb B. Clements, Henry M. Porter, and John W. Smith, gave land which in turn could be sold to establish a building fund.¹⁰ Even then, a bill in 1870 to provide funds to fence and landscape the capitol site failed, because some of these gifts of land required that the capital be located permanently in Denver, and such a condition did not yet exist.¹¹ Since nothing was done to begin construction, the territorial government continued to lease quarters here and there in the lower part of town.

In 1872 a bill was passed requiring that, when cash gifts of \$10,000 were on hand, the donated lots should be sold and bids solicited for construction of the capitol.¹² Nothing was done. In 1874 a bill was introduced to enable improvements of the grounds in the amount of \$50,000.¹³ In the following months capitol commissioners were appointed to take charge of the donated lots and to proceed with building the capitol. Still nothing was done.

The haggling in the legislature was extreme that year, centering around rivalry for the capital city. Indeed, in 1874 a proposal to make Pueblo the capital passed in the House and was only narrowly defeated in the Council.¹⁴ Apparently out of patience, Henry Brown finally announced in 1875 that, unless \$75,000 in improvements were made, he would file a deed of revocation for the land he had given. Another block to construction arose, however; for, when Colorado attained statehood in 1876, Denver was made only the temporary capital until a permanent one was determined by vote of the people in 1881.

In 1879 Brown carried out his threat.¹⁵ Not only did he revoke the deed, but he also put up a fence around the plot. The attorney general in turn issued an act of ejection, and the affair went to court. Brown's revocation may have been aimed at easing his own current financial straits or regaining the land which was increasing in value, despite its still being "out in the

⁵ F. J. Bancroft, "Address before the State Historical and Natural History Society, February 6, 1885," p. 1. (Typescript in the files of the State Historical Society of Colorado Library.)

⁶ The old Court House was torn down in the 1930's.

⁷ *Denver Tribune*, November 10, 1881.

⁸ William R. Pyle, "History of the Colorado State Capitol Complex" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of Denver, 1962), p. 8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰ Smiley, *History of Denver*, p. 507.

¹¹ *Colorado Transcript*, February 9, 1870.

¹² *Colorado Territory, Legislative Assembly, Session Laws, 9th Sess., 1872*, pp. 66-67.

¹³ *Denver Tribune*, November 10, 1881.

¹⁴ Smiley, *History of Denver*, p. 460.

¹⁵ *Colorado, Supreme Court Docket, Exhibit B*, fol. 85-90.

country." But it has also been claimed that his move forced action which would legally fix the location of the capital in Denver.

In the fall of 1881 Denver was finally voted the permanent capital;¹⁶ and the General Assembly, pending settlement of the Brown litigation, created a building fund and voted money for grading the future capitol site.¹⁷ In granting statehood, Congress had given sixty sections of land to provide a source of funds for public buildings. By 1883 this money was sufficient that the Assembly voted to proceed with the construction of one wing which could later comprise part of the capitol building. Designs for the capitol were sought, and construction on the wing was to follow immediately. The law also created a Board of Capitol Managers, which was to administer the business of construction.¹⁸ In addition, the block lying between Lincoln and Broadway in front of the capitol site was to be acquired;¹⁹ it was purchased from W. S. Cheesman and George W. Kassler in 1883 for \$100,000. But not until the state's title to the Brown land was finally confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1886 and some cases of litigation in connection with the other donated lands were settled, were these latter lands sold, the building fund gaining \$125,233 through their sale.²⁰

During the interim members of the Board of Capitol Managers had promptly advertised for building plans, had traveled to inspect the capitols of other states, and had begun to examine building materials.²¹ (This investigation revealed many sources of excellent building stone hitherto not known to exist in the state.) But the idea of beginning the one wing was soon ruled out, as it was not in accordance with the law. Twenty sets of plans were submitted, not only for the distinction of selection for the important structure but also for one of the cash prizes which had been offered for the three best designs.²² E. E. Myers, who had designed the Arapahoe County Court House for Court Place, turned in the first-place winner, and the building was constructed from his plan with only two revisions of the basic design.²³

¹⁶ *Denver Tribune*, November 21, 1882.

¹⁷ Smiley, *History of Denver*, p. 508.

¹⁸ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 4th Sess., 1883, pp. 44-50.


¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 38-50.

²⁰ Pyle, "History of the Colorado State Capitol Complex," p. 17.

²¹ Colorado, Board of Capitol Managers, *Third Biennial Report: 1888*, p. 7, and *Fourth Biennial Report: 1890*, pp. 6-7.

²² "The Colorado Capitol," *Harper's Weekly*, XXX (May 1, 1886), 283.

²³ Myers previously was architect for the capitols of Michigan, Texas, and Idaho, and later for Utah. Following his work in Colorado, he was employed by the federal government and passed on buildings for the 1893 world's fair



Architect E. E. Myers also designed capitols for Texas, Michigan, Idaho, and Utah.

Early in 1885, with the state's building fund containing about \$1,100,000,²⁴ an act was passed providing for the construction of the capitol. The economy-minded legislature limited the cost to \$1,000,000 with annual expenditures not to exceed \$200,000 a year. In 1890 the projected construction was supposed to be completed.²⁵ However, all bids were too high. Two of the contenders presented reduced bids with an Illinois contractor, W. D. Richardson, finally winning the job. Peter Gumry, who had also worked on the Court House, was employed as construction superintendent. Noting these accomplishments with approval, *Harper's Weekly* commented in 1886: "Colorado . . . has set about securing for herself a Statehouse . . . which shall be, as her people delight in saying, 'Worthy of her dignity and proud distinction as a Centennial State.' Though ridiculously rich and extremely young, Colorado has not, however, allowed herself to be led into wild architectural extravagances. . . ."²⁶

It was decided that white sandstone would be an adequate material for the building. Some delays occurred in the first year of work when Gumry reported that the soil would necessitate basement walls eight feet deeper than originally proposed. Sandstone for these foundations came from Arkins, Colorado. Then in the spring of 1887 it was discovered that Richardson had overdrawn on his contract, which was promptly canceled, and the contract fell to Geddes and Seerie.²⁷

in Chicago. He also designed the Parliament Building in Rio de Janeiro. Alexander R. Butler, "A 'Wilderness Rejoicing': The New Capitol of Michigan, 1871-79," *Michigan History*, XXXVIII (September, 1954), 273-84.

²⁴ Smiley, *History of Denver*, p. 509.

²⁵ Colorado, Board of Capitol Managers, *Second Biennial Report: 1886*, pp. 82-85.

²⁶ *Harper's Weekly*, XXX (1886), 283.

²⁷ Smiley, *History of Denver*, p. 509.



Sherman Street is at the right in this W. H. Jackson photograph taken from the light tower near Eighteenth and Grant in the early 1880's. The site on which the Capitol was built is visible in the background.

Two years later, in 1889, Myers himself was to meet a fate similar to Richardson's in an inadequately explained action of the Board of Capitol Managers. Local newspapers may have touched closest to the real reason. The *Rocky Mountain News* claimed that Myers had known all along that the capitol could not be constructed within Richardson's bid and thereby caused the latter's downfall.²⁸ On the other hand, the *Denver Republican* charged that Otto Mears, one of the Managers, had said that Myers would be getting a large commission from increased costs of the construction, whereas his services in return could easily be dispensed with.²⁹

Such cost increases were not merely oversights on Myers' part, for the legislature in April, 1889, authorized a change to the use of granite instead of sandstone and approved a total expense of \$2,000,000.³⁰ The following month the Zugelder quarry at Aberdeen, near Gunnison, Colorado, was leased and opened up.³¹ Apparently the legislature was becoming more and more expansive in its attitude toward the capitol project, for it also approved a change from woodwork to marble and iron for interior finish at this time.

²⁸ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), June 4, 1889.

²⁹ *Denver Republican*, June 4, 1889.

³⁰ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 7th Sess., 1886, p. 366.

³¹ During the period when the stonework was being done, granite in ten- to twelve-ton blocks was shipped on the Denver and Rio Grande narrow gauge to Salida, then reloaded to standard gauge equipment and shipped to Denver where drays pulled the blocks to the Capitol grounds. There a crew of about two hundred men processed and dressed the stone.

The cornerstone of the Capitol was laid on July 4, 1890, with elaborate ceremonies. An impressive parade began the affair, and a Masonic choir of about one thousand voices took part at the functions. Afterward three hundred waiters served barbecued beef in Lincoln Park to the assembled throng, which had filled every sleeping room in Denver and twenty special trains besides.³²

By this time it had become rather clear to everyone that the costs of the proud edifice taking shape on the hill were going to be well over \$2,000,000. In an effort to economize, the Board of Capitol Managers decided that the duties of a supervising architect could be dispensed with entirely, and construction superintendent Peter Gumry henceforth performed that function without additional pay.³³ The Board, for their part, despite a new ruling granting salaries as well as expenses, refrained from ever submitting a bill until their salaries were revoked in 1897.³⁴ A bond issue for \$300,000 voted in the fall of 1891 also helped to meet the rising costs.

In November, 1894, Governor Davis Waite and his executive department were able to move into the still-uncompleted Capitol. The wandering legislature at last occupied its own chambers the following January, and the rest of the state government began to move into the Capitol later in 1895.³⁵

Having struggled through the economic upheavals of the Panic of 1893, the once-again prosperous and growing state was ready to finish its building with style. The lawns had been graded. From Beulah, southwest of Pueblo, large boulders of pink marble, called Colorado onyx, now were shipped to Denver in large chunks. This rare material was used for wainscoting.



In addition, a power plant was installed in the basement,³⁶ and the dome and roof lines were strung with lights for festive occasions. By 1900, with Colorado's Yule marble quarries closed down, marble for the steps between the second and third floors had to be brought in from Tennessee.³⁷ Other materials were imported for the dome, and brass for the stair rails and other trim came from Ohio.³⁸

A finishing touch, which captured considerable attention, was the set of stained-glass windows known as the Hall of Fame. Although Myers originally specified that "capping the rotunda will be the . . . dome, set with stained-glass windows," Frank Edbrooke, who became the supervising architect in 1898, generally is credited with the idea of the sixteen windows which honor pioneers of Colorado. A host of names, proposed by various individuals, groups, and newspapers, resulted in a two-year fray, until the Board of Capitol Managers settled on a final list. The windows were made in Denver by the Copeland Glass Company from designs by Thomas H. Neil of New York.³⁹ Other portraits and murals in the Capitol were also given in later years.

Gilt for the dome was suggested by Edbrooke when other coating materials proved unsatisfactory,⁴⁰ although Otto Mears is said to have proposed the idea a decade earlier for a symbol of the state's source of wealth.⁴¹ The gold was applied in 1907 and a glass globe was placed at the crown in July, 1908. With it in place the construction was completed. The total cost had been \$2,729,389.63.⁴²

The grounds themselves were embellished with several gifts. The flagpole on the lower level of the west lawn, between Lincoln and Broadway, was given to honor Spanish-American War Veterans by the Sons of the Revolution of Denver.⁴³ The statue to the Civil War soldiers at the west portico was unveiled

³² *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), July 5, 1890.

³³ Colorado, Board of Capitol Managers, *Fifth Biennial Report: 1892*, pp. 5-6.

³⁴ Smiley, *History of Denver*, p. 512.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 513.

³⁶ *Denver Republican*, June 18, 1896.

³⁷ *Denver Times*, January 31, 1900.

³⁸ *Illustrated Weekly*, XV (October 4, 1905), 1.

³⁹ Caroline Bancroft, "Hall of Fame," *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), June 3, 1959. The group includes William Gilpin, John Evans, William N. Byers, Bela M. Hughes, Alexander Majors, Jim Baker, Kit Carson, John L. Dyer, Ouray, J. W. Denver, Nathaniel P. Hill, William J. Palmer, Casimiro Barela, Dr. R. G. Buckingham, Benjamin H. Eaton, and Frances W. Jacobs.

⁴⁰ Colorado, Board of Capitol Managers, *Tenth Biennial Report: 1902*, p. 9.

⁴¹ Paul D. Harrison, "Building Colorado's Capitol," *Denver Westerners Brand Book*, XV (Boulder: Johnson Publishing Co., 1960), 229.

⁴² The source of this figure is given as the disbursements itemized in Board of Capitol Managers' reports, cited in Pyle, "History of the Colorado State Capitol Complex," p. 41.

⁴³ *Denver Republican*, May 3, 1899.

in 1909. Designed by Captain Jack Howland, a Colorado veteran,⁴⁴ the statue cost \$20,000, the legislature appropriating \$5,000 and the Pioneers' Society giving the rest. The two Napoleon howitzers beside this memorial once belonged to the Chaffee Light Artillery. After the state sold them, the Colorado veterans, wanting them returned, purchased them back with funds given by David Moffat and members of the Chaffee Light Artillery.⁴⁵ The bronze statue of an Indian and buffalo, called "The Closing Era," was erected on the east lawn in 1898. Designed and cast by Preston Powers, an art teacher at the University of Denver, the work first was displayed at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893.⁴⁶

While the Capitol was being built, the city of Denver and Arapahoe County were also experiencing growing pains. The county, still a long, narrow slice extending from the Kansas line to the mountains, contained more than one-fourth of the state's population, and most of that was in Denver. By 1898 there was a public desire for a change to a city-county government for Denver, to be set apart from the remainder of the county.⁴⁷ The City and County of Denver was created by amendment to Colorado's constitution in 1901,⁴⁸ and in 1904 Denver became a home-rule city.

Robert W. Speer became the mayor of Denver in the same year. In November, 1904, the Art Commission sent a letter to



"One man truly proud of his city is worth a hundred well-meaning but indifferent persons."
Robert W. Speer (1916)

Speer recommending the adoption of an over-all plan for the city's public buildings. Following Speer's instructions, the commission requested such a plan from Charles Mulford Robinson, a nationally-recognized authority on civic planning. Robinson's design, involving several blocks between the Capitol and the Court House at Court Place, would have created a real civic center. However, the plan was turned down by the voters in 1906. Nevertheless, Speer's imagination had been sparked, and he did all in his power to keep the dream alive. A Civic Center Committee which he appointed studied Robinson's plan and endorsed it wholeheartedly in 1907.⁴⁹ In its report the committee, having absorbed the complete concept of a civic center, described nobly what it believed such a center might be:

A true civic center should be a focal point to gather up and unite converging lines of communication; it should provide commanding sites for public and semi-public buildings, with open frontage to justify and display that architectural dignity which is the crowning distinction of a beautiful city; finally, it should provide space for a public promenade, suitable for adornment by private gifts and bequests, where visitors as well as citizens may find provision for the enjoyment of open-air music amid pleasant and appropriate surroundings.⁵⁰

Speer had accumulated considerable experience in the city's government. He had been city clerk and postmaster of Denver, as well as police commissioner and fire commissioner. In these offices he had developed powerful political backing and a thorough knowledge of the inner workings of the city.⁵¹ Despite a hard-headed caniness in handling political affairs, Speer was also possessed of a dream of civic beauty and dignity, which considerable travel abroad and study of European cities further enhanced. Denver's history from 1904 until 1912, the end of his

second term, was marked by a dramatic change in the city's appearance, from the growth of the city's parks and the development of its boulevards to the control of Cherry Creek's bed, the planting of thousands of trees, and the installation of a sewer system.⁵²

After the Robinson civic center plan was rejected by the electorate in 1906, the city government pressed on with plans for a pioneer monument within the area of the center. The land, on which a fire station had stood, was given by the city with the provision that \$40,000 be secured within two years for the monument itself.⁵³ Also, the Bates Triangle was purchased for a new park. This idea had been proposed some years earlier, but Frederick MacMonnies provided the real impetus. When MacMonnies was in Denver as consultant for his design for the Pioneer Monument, he suggested that the Civic Center should be a cruciform plaza between Broadway and Bannock, south of Fourteenth Street, and that it should include the Bates Triangle.⁵⁴ As a result, the monument, dedicated in 1910, and the center can be said to have begun together. Of its total cost of \$75,000, the state gave \$10,000, the city \$7,500 in addition to the land, and private donors provided the remainder.⁵⁵ On a base of Colorado granite, the bronze monument is topped with a mounted figure of Kit Carson.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, a plan had evolved to acquire the land to which MacMonnies had pointed for the Civic Center. During the park expansion program the East Denver Park District had had no special assessment, as had the other districts. Since the Civic Center site lay within the East Denver Park District, it was decided that this district should bear the cost of acquiring the land.⁵⁷ Although only a minority of the property owners protested, a vociferous quarrel ensued. Not until 1918 did the Colorado Supreme Court dispose of the last legal protest attempting to make the entire city pay the costs. The total price of the lands purchased was \$1,931,309.⁵⁸

The first city building erected on the site, even before most

⁴⁴ *Denver Post*, July 25, 1909.

⁴⁵ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), n.d., clipping file, Denver Public Library Western History Department. The two cannon beside the Civil War monument are sometimes said mistakenly to have been General Sibley's howitzers, buried in his retreat from New Mexico. The State Historical Society of Colorado possesses the four Sibley mountain howitzers owned by Colorado. These are smaller than the Napoleon howitzers on the Capitol grounds.

⁴⁶ The statue first was intended to be a sculpture in rock at Perry Park, south of Denver, for a real estate development. When this plan fell through, women of Denver raised money to have the bronze made. Powers requested his friend John Greenleaf Whittier to write the inscription for the base. John R. Henderson, "The Indian and Buffalo Statue on the State Capitol Grounds," *The Colorado Magazine*, XIII (September, 1936), 185.

⁴⁷ Smiley, *History of Denver*, p. 637.

⁴⁸ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 22d Sess., 1901, p. 97. The rest of the old county was divided into Adams and South Arapahoe Counties. A year later Adams County was further subdivided and South Arapahoe County renamed Arapahoe.

⁴⁹ Edgar C. McMeachen (ed.), *Robert W. Speer: A City Builder* (Denver: City and County of Denver, 1919), p. 46.

⁵⁰ *Municipal Facts*, II (May 14, 1910), 10.

⁵¹ McMeachen, *Robert W. Speer*, p. 13.

⁵² In addition, Speer inaugurated an extensive, free municipal entertainment program, the Municipal Auditorium with its organ—Speer's special joy—being added during this period.

⁵³ *Denver Republican*, July 25, 1906.

⁵⁴ McMeachen, *Robert W. Speer*, p. 46.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁵⁶ In 1936 the State Historical Society of Colorado and the Pioneers' Society unveiled a tablet on the base, marking the terminus of the Smoky Hill Trail.

⁵⁷ McMeachen, *Robert W. Speer*, p. 46.

⁵⁸ Ben Draper, "History of the City and County Building" (unpublished typescript prepared by the city clerk, City and County of Denver, 1935, in the Denver Public Library Western History Department).

of the land was acquired, was the Denver Public Library, now the Board of Water Commissioners' Building. Built in a classical design with gray sandstone from Turkey Creek near Pueblo, it was dedicated in November, 1909. Of the total cost of \$450,000, \$200,000 was a gift from Andrew Carnegie.⁵⁹

Speer's dream was nearly scuttled after 1912 by his successor, Mayor Henry J. Arnold. Without an over-all plan in mind, Arnold announced that four buildings akin to the Public Library would be built, and demolition of structures on the site was begun.⁶⁰ The planned center was saved, though, by the adoption of a commission form of government, the center then passing into the hands of a commissioner of property.⁶¹ The first commissioner completed the removal of buildings and planted lawns, but nothing was accomplished under the next.

When Speer became mayor again in 1916, he asked E. H. Bennett, a Chicago landscape architect, to create a plan for the center open space. As developed, the Civic Center is essentially Bennett's plan. The Colonnade of Civic Benefactors and the outdoor theater, originally Speer's idea, were intended to encourage public giving in all areas of civic life, by providing a public place where the names of major donors could be presented. Costing \$185,000, these parts of the center were paid for from a fund established in 1912 from telephone company payments for the use of city streets.⁶² Unfortunately, these improvements were not dedicated until 1919, a year after Speer's death. The inscription was added in 1923 with the names of donors to the Pioneer Monument, the Municipal Auditorium curtains and organ, and the Burns Monument.

Through Speer's inspired and persistent urgings, more than a half-million dollars' worth of gifts were given to the city in private donations during the year and a half from late 1916 to 1918. For the Civic Center, these included the two bronze statues, "The Bucking Broncho" given by J. K. Mullen, and "The Indian Scout" given by Stephen Knight. Both were designed by A. Phimister Proctor and were completed in 1919 at a cost of \$15,000 each.⁶³ Murals commemorating Charles H. Toll, an attorney general of Colorado, were painted in the portals of the theater by Allen True, who also did the murals in the Voorhies Memorial as well as those in the Capitol rotunda.



The Voorhies Memorial is at the far right in this Civic Center plan.

The Voorhies Memorial Entrance, opposite the theater, was made possible through a bequest of \$115,000 left by J. H. P. Voorhies, a pioneer of Denver. Designed by Fisher and Fisher, the gateway was completed in 1918.⁶⁴ Excess funds enabled the pool, fountain, and murals to be added to the plan. The two bronze sea lions in the pool were done by Denver sculptor Robert Garrison.⁶⁵

The total cost of the improvements in the Civic Center up until that time was almost a million dollars. The interest and support of the public is seen in that more than half of this amount had come from private donations, the rest from the city.⁶⁶ Notwithstanding this generous support, however, the work fell far short of the original plan. Even with Speer's unflagging enthusiasm, the Civic Center's progress had lagged, and his death foreshortened the final result to a great extent. Almost a year after his death, an article in *Municipal Facts* pointed out that fourteen years of effort had seen the project less than half finished. In describing future plans, the article observed: "Eventually it will include three buildings; the City and County building facing the State Capitol across the center; the present library building enlarged so as to provide more shelf

⁵⁹ McMechen, *Robert W. Speer*, p. 47.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, 48.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁶⁵ In 1921 paving was brought around behind the memorial, thus eliminating the sharp turn on Fifteenth Street. *Municipal Facts*, IV (August, 1921), 15.


⁶⁶ Draper, "History of the City and County Building," p. 13.

space and to conform with the general architectural plan of the center; an Art Gallery built upon the same design as the library, and corresponding to it in size and outer appearance. . . .⁶⁷

In 1921 part of the originally proposed land was lost when the University of Denver's School of Commerce, Accounts, and Finance purchased a parcel on Bannock Street, opposite the library.⁶⁸ Finally, in 1923 the electorate voted to place its City and County Building on Bannock street, the present location, and approved a \$500,000 bond issue to purchase the land.⁶⁹ The block cost \$537,661, the purchase being completed by the spring of 1924.

In the fall of 1924 the city contracted with a group of thirty-nine architects, known as the Allied Architects Association, to prepare plans for the City and County Building, with the confidence that the building fund contained almost a million dollars.⁷⁰

Prepared by the Allied Architects Association, this plan shows the City and County Building in relation to other Civic Center features.



There was some delay caused by a lawsuit regarding the specifications in the submitted plans calling for use of foreign materials, while state law required use of Colorado materials; but Denver, having home rule, was able to circumvent this law.⁷¹ Stone for finishing included a wide variety as the building was completed.⁷² The bronze entrance doors of this showpiece were the largest ever cast, so heavy, in fact, that several were replaced in 1959 for the benefit of people who could not open them. (The metal melted down paid for the replacement.) The building was completed in the summer of 1932 at a cost of \$4,649,457.61.⁷³ The city council officially adopted the name "City and County Building" in the fall of 1932.⁷⁴ In October, 1932, work began on the installation of the Speer memorial clock and chimes in the building's tower. These were a gift from Kate A. Speer in memory of her late husband Robert W. Speer.⁷⁵

Completing the city buildings in the center are the Denver Art Museum, the new Public Library, and the Board of Water Commissioners' Building. An art museum began in 1910 when the Denver Art Association, formerly the Denver Artists' Club, was offered the use of a gallery in the Denver Public Library.⁷⁶ From 1922 until 1933 the Denver Art Museum was housed in Chappell House, and then rooms in the fourth floor of the City and County Building were turned over to the museum. However, the long-range thought was that an art museum could be built

⁶⁷ *Municipal Facts*, II (April, 1919), 3-4.

⁶⁸ *Municipal Facts*, IV (November-December, 1921), 15.

⁶⁹ *Municipal Facts*, VI (May, 1923), 4.

⁷⁰ There was some speculation at this time concerning moving the entire Public Library Building to improve the view from the Capitol. *Municipal Facts*, VII (May-June, 1924), 14. Also, a city landscape consultant, S. R. De Boer, proposed extending the Civic Center west as far as Speer Boulevard, an idea which has been considered from time to time since. *Municipal Facts*, VII (September-October, 1924), 2.

⁷¹ *Municipal Facts*, VII (September-October, 1924), 2.

⁷² *Denver Post*, January 24, 1928.

⁷³ In the main lobby are eight monoliths of Colorado travertine, which also lines the main corridors. The floors in the corridor are tirazza with pink Tennessee marble. Colorado Yule marble was used for public office counters and in restrooms, but many baseboards are of Vermont marble. Black and gold marble from Italy is used in baseboards in the main corridor. Tennessee marble was used in floor borders and stair treads as well as in lining the main entrances to offices. Italian marble trimmed the courtrooms and the main vestibule, while a rare Florentine was placed in exterior inserts. Draper, "History of the City and County Building," pp. 8, 26.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁷⁵ Gifts on the Civic Center grounds have included commemorative trees, plaques, and so on. In 1935 two flagpoles with fountains at the bases were erected through a bequest of Camille S. Edbrooke. *Denver Post*, November 6, 1935. The Emily Griffith Drinking Fountain, southeast of the Board of Water Commissioners' Building, was given in memory of the founder of Denver's Opportunity School by A. P. Adamo who, as an immigrant boy, was helped by Emily Griffith and who later became a civic leader in Detroit. *Denver Post*, June 18, 1954.

⁷⁶ Anne Evans, "The Genesis of the Denver Art Museum," *The Art Register*, II (November 1931), 45.

as a companion structure to the library through private donations.⁷⁷ Instead, the city condemned land in 1948 on the northwest corner of West Thirteenth Avenue and Acoma for the Denver Art Commission, and on this site the Schleier Memorial Branch of the Denver Art Museum was opened in November, 1949. As pressure increased for space used by the museum in the City and County Building, additions to the art museum were made. Although the Denver Art Museum owns these lands, buildings, and collections, having acquired them through private gifts, the museum is linked with city government through the City Art Commission, and the city pays the museum's maintenance and salaries.

The Denver Public Library also began informally. In 1898 the public lending facility from East High School and the Mercantile Library from the Chamber of Commerce Building combined their holdings at Fifteenth Street and Court Place. After Carnegie's gift toward the new building in 1903, the library was located temporarily at La Veta Place until the new building was finished in 1909.⁷⁸ The library moved to its three-million-dollar home at Broadway and Fourteenth in 1956.

When the old public library was vacated, it was remodeled for the Water Board, which had been housed in the City and County Building. Gordon D. White was the architect for the \$600,000 remodeling. The major phases were installing three floor levels in the well previously occupied by library stacks and removing the massive steps at the front to permit a ground-floor entrance. In April, 1958, the building was occupied by the Water Commissioners, who had been housed in much-needed space in the City and County Building.

Shortly after the turn of the century the state began adding other buildings to the capitol complex, thus contributing to the fringe of heterogeneous architecture around both the Capitol and the Civic Center. The first of these structures was the State Museum. The growing collections of the State Historical and Natural History Society had been moved from the Court House to the Capitol when it was completed. In 1906 the Board of Capitol Managers recommended that these exhibits and papers should be placed in a fireproof building near the Capitol and that land should be purchased and a building erected.⁷⁹ In the spring of 1909 the legislature appropriated \$100,000 for the



purchase of a site, for plans for a museum building, and for the start of construction.⁸⁰ The southeast corner of Sherman and Fourteenth was purchased for \$32,000, and Frank E. Edbrooke was authorized to prepare plans. According to a contemporary news account, the original Civic Center plan to place the museum opposite the library was abandoned to save in the cost of utilities and services.⁸¹ Constructed of granite from Cotopaxi and Colorado Yule marble, the museum opened on September 2, 1915,⁸² having cost a total of \$550,000 including land and furnishings.⁸³

The Managers had also recognized that the state government would need more space for offices, and in 1912 they recommended the purchase of additional building sites.⁸⁴ Five years later, in 1917, the legislature appropriated \$120,000 for the purchase of the two corner lots at Colfax and Sherman and the southwest corner of Fourteenth and Sherman.⁸⁵ Since the two sites north of the Capitol together cost more than \$100,000, the third was not purchased.⁸⁶

In April, 1919, the legislature approved the construction of the State Office Building on the northeast corner of Colfax and Sherman,⁸⁷ and William N. Bowman was named architect.

⁷⁷ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), August 1, 1932.

⁷⁸ "Seventy-five Years" (Denver Public Library monograph, c. 1956).

⁷⁹ Colorado, Board of Capitol Managers, *Twelfth Biennial Report: 1906*, pp. 9-10.

⁸⁰ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 17th Sess., 1909, pp. 192-93.

⁸¹ *Denver Republican*, October 3, 1909.

⁸² Colorado, State Historical Society, *Biennial Report of the State Historical and Natural History Society of Colorado* (December 1, 1914, to November 30, 1916), p. 5.

⁸³ Pyle, "History of the Colorado State Capitol Complex," p. 52.

⁸⁴ Colorado, Board of Capitol Managers, *Fifteenth Biennial Report: 1912*, pp. 12-13.

⁸⁵ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 21st Sess., 1917, pp. 106-07.

⁸⁶ Pyle, "History of the Colorado State Capitol Complex," p. 55.

⁸⁷ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 22d Sess., 1919, pp. 138-39.



The cornerstone of the State Office Building was laid on June 5, 1920.

Construction was begun in August of that year; the use of Italian marble in the first floor and Vermont marble in the remainder was permitted because the Yule quarries were closed again.⁸⁸ Robert Garrison was the sculptor of the bronze lions at the south entrance. Having cost a total of \$1,494,374.85, this building opened in the spring of 1921.⁸⁹

Again in June, 1937, the legislature authorized the construction of an office building, the State Capitol Annex, across the street from the museum at Fourteenth and Sherman, as well as an adjacent shop and power plant.⁹⁰ In August the federal Public Works Administration authorized a grant to assist with the building.⁹¹ Colorado Yule marble was used on the exteriors of the two buildings, the last use of this marble before a flood in 1941 closed the quarry operations. Accepted by Governor Ralph Carr on September 9, 1939,⁹² the two buildings had cost about \$700,000 from state funds and \$560,000 from federal funds.⁹³

The *Denver Post* had remarked in 1937 that the Annex would fill only a third of the state's current needs for office space,⁹⁴ and ten years later the legislature was, indeed, authorizing another office building.⁹⁵ Cost estimates were too low, so a second bill was needed in 1955 to allow better financing.⁹⁶

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁸⁹ Colorado, Board of Capitol Managers, *Twentieth Biennial Report: 1922*, pp. 15-20.

⁹⁰ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 31st Sess., 1937, pp. 516-18.

⁹¹ Letter from George M. Bull, director of the Colorado Emergency Administration of Public Works, to Colorado Governor Teller Ammons, August 25, 1937, Colorado State Archives and Records Service, Executive Council: Correspondence: 1935-1941.

⁹² *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), September 9, 1939.

⁹³ Pyle, "History of the Colorado State Capitol Complex," p. 69.

⁹⁴ *Denver Post*, December 26, 1937.

⁹⁵ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 36th Sess., 1947, pp. 391-93.

⁹⁶ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 40th Sess., 1955, pp. 859-60.

Work on the new structure, the State Services Building, was held up for almost two years by city zoning problems relating to parking so that final dedication ceremonies were not held until June 14, 1960. The building had cost \$3,756,188, and the 180,000 square feet of space were completely occupied that fall, while many agencies were still renting offices.

In order to meet future needs and to help eliminate the type of piecemeal construction required since the building of the Capitol, both the state and the city-county governments are presently undertaking large-scale master planning for Denver.⁹⁷ One is reminded that similar issues were confronting the city a half-century ago. At that time a Denver newspaper commented on what Denver's Civic Center might be. Perhaps the statement could have included a capitol complex, too, since the two were being linked physically in Denver. "A civic center is not solely a beautiful plaza or park. . . . It has a far deeper relation to the life of the municipality insofar as it implies a center from which flow much of the inspiration and activity of the city," the article pointed out. "It should differ from other beautiful spots, in the opportunity offered by its location at the convergence of the principal arteries of travel, for the gradual grouping around it of public buildings. . . . [U]niformity of architecture is of first importance and . . . the highest type of beauty can only be assured by the use of one sort of architecture. . . . The jumble of buildings that surround us in our new cities . . . destroys that repose within us which is the true basis of all contentment. . . ."⁹⁸

VIRGINIA McCONNELL has recently been assisting with the research and publication activities of the Society. She is the author of several studies dealing with Colorado history, including *Bayou Salado: The Story of South Park*.

⁹⁷ In 1967 a contract was awarded to SUA, Inc., of Beverly Hills, California, to prepare an analysis of the Capitol's internal space utilization needs for the next twenty years and to develop a master plan for future use. A general design concept of the Capitol site was also contracted for with John Carl Warnecke and Associates of California. These studies are to consider both the functional and aesthetic needs of the state's capitol complex. Similarly, in 1956 Denver's planning board authorized a committee to develop a plan for the Civic Center's future growth and cited at the time the special problems of traffic and parking and the need for a new art museum and an office building. The general site plan recently developed by James Sudler and Associates at the request of the city has incorporated improvements to the Civic Center open space as well as building proposals.

⁹⁸ *Denver Republican*, October 5, 1909.

Wilderness:

Concept and Challenge

BY DONALD N. BALDWIN

The "wilderness concept," the conservation of America's natural heritage through the preservation of wilderness areas,¹ was first translated into a functional plan with actual results during the period from 1919 to 1933. The source of this initiative lay within the United States Forest Service, specifically the Denver office of that agency. The prime mover within the organization in this regard was Arthur Hawthorne Carhart, whose principal drive came not only from general conservationist sentiments but also from the orientation derived from his profession of landscape architecture.

Just as Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893 had been disturbed by the foreseeable consequences of the closing of the frontier,² there were men in the post-World War I period who found the rapid diminution in the amount of wilderness land alarming and who pointed to the need to protect the remaining superlative scenic areas for recreational use. This was a use for which the Congress had up until then allotted the Forest Service little money, and for which the Service had even fewer plans or policies; such a use seemed visionary, if not irrational, to many officials. Despite this view, the decade following World War I was epochal for the conservation movement in the United States, because it marked the beginning of an important stage in which a new brand of conservation was carried out.³

¹In Forest Service and conservationist terminology, a wilderness area has come to be broadly defined as one which remains in its natural, wild state, undisturbed by man-made roads and structures.

²Frederick Jackson Turner, *Frontier and Section: Selected Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 37-62.

³Frederick L. Paxson, *Postwar Years: Normalcy, 1918-1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), pp. 161-63, 381-82. See also Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 302. Although Donald C. Swain did note that the period 1921-1933 was a "time of preparation for greater forestry accomplishment in the future," his book did not point to the positive gains in wilderness preservation in the National Forests but in the National Parks. Donald C. Swain, *Federal Conservation Policy, 1921-1933* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 29, 123-43.

An authority on conservation has noted recently that there now exist numerous biographies and historical monographs which analyze and describe the conservation problems in our National Forests and our National Parks.⁴ Despite the abundance of such material, there is a dearth of literature on the topic of outdoor recreation,⁵ particularly that phase or type of outdoor recreation requiring "wilderness" as an essential ingredient. Although conservation organizations have published rather extensive writings on the subject of wilderness, there remains a wide gap in the accounts of the origin and initial application of the wilderness concept which needs to be bridged. The lacuna referred to is the absence of the detailed facts concerning the genesis and first applications of the wilderness concept during the period 1919-1924. These early actions began at Trappers Lake, Colorado, in 1919, setting a precedent. The second application occurred in the Superior National Forest, Minnesota, in 1921, and the third in the Gila National Forest, New Mexico, in 1924. It is the first two applications which have not previously been covered in the historical accounts of the evolution of the wilderness concept.

A thorough examination of materials prepared by the Forest Service and by conservation organizations has disclosed that the available accounts begin with the third and omit any reference to the first two. According to a 1963 Forest Service pamphlet, for example, "nearly 40 years ago" the Forest Service pioneered in preserving America's wilderness heritage "led by Aldo Leopold," then the assistant forester of District 3, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This tribute is historically inaccurate. Continuing in this vein, the booklet stated:

The Forest Service pioneered this concept in the 1920's. Studies of wild lands on the National Forests began, and in 1924 a large part of what is now the Gila Wilderness in New Mexico was set aside as a special area for the preservation of wilderness. The Gila, the nation's first designated wilderness, contains 500,000 acres of primitive American lands astride the Mogollon Rim and Diablo mountain ranges.⁶

⁴Roderick W. Nash, "Man and Nature in America," *Forest History*, VII (Winter, 1964), 21-22. Nash's review concerned the book by Arthur A. Kirch, Jr., *Man and Nature in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), which he stated was a "rehash" of "widely documented portions of American history such as the campaigns for forest conservation and the national parks."

⁵Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC), Study Report No. 27 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 1-3.

⁶U.S., Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, *Wilderness*, Pamphlet No. 459 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 3. It also identified Henry David Thoreau as one of the first Americans who spoke out for the preservation of wildlands "just over 100 years ago."

The quotation above is vague and incorrect on several counts. But among conservationists, the foregoing account of the origin of the wilderness concept has apparently been accepted. For example, a 1940 publication of the Wilderness Society likewise traced wilderness areas from "their formal beginning in the mind and on the pen point of Aldo Leopold to the achievement by Robert Marshall of a practical new wilderness system in the National Forests."⁷ Moreover, Harvey Broome stated: "Unquestionably, Aldo Leopold was the Jeremiah of wilderness thinking."⁸ Broome explained that in 1925 Leopold had written an article about the value of wilderness,⁹ from which Robert Marshall had quoted five years later.¹⁰ "But if Leopold was the prophet of the wilderness movement," Broome asserted, "Marshall was the first to suggest organization."¹¹ Broome did not, however, take into account the accomplishments, publications, and activities of Arthur Carhart between 1919 and 1924.

In this connection, it is instructive to note what Aldo Leopold himself stated when he attempted to trace the "origin and ideals of wilderness areas."¹² In 1940 he wrote:

I will here attempt to cover the history of the wilderness movement in the Southwest prior to 1926. I suppose subsequent events are too well known to require comment.

The earliest action I can find in my files is a letter dated September 21, 1922, notifying the District Forester that two local Game Protective Associations had endorsed the establishment of a wilderness area on the head of the Gila River, in the Gila National Forest. I suppose one may assume a prior "incubation period" of a year or two. I take it, then, that the movement in the Southwest must have started about 1920.

This assumption is further corroborated by the publication, in 1921, of my paper, "The Wilderness and Its Place in Forest Recreational Policy. . . ." In 1924 the action stage was reached. I have a map dated March 31 [1924] showing the Gila area boundaries as originally proposed by me and as approved by District Forester F. C. W. Pooler. I do not know when Washington finally added its approval.

How widely had the idea spread by 1924? I offer in evidence the resolutions passed by the National Conference on Outdoor Recreation (*Jour. Forestry*, October, 1924) which contain no mention of wilderness.¹³

⁷ Robert Sterling Yard, "Saving the Wilderness," *The Living Wilderness*, V (July, 1940), 3.

⁸ Harvey Broome, "Origins of the Wilderness Society," *The Living Wilderness*, V (July, 1940), 13.

⁹ *Ibid.*, citing Aldo Leopold, "The Last Stand of American Wilderness," *American Forests and Forest Life*, XXXI (October, 1925), 599-604.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, citing Robert Marshall, "The Problem of Wilderness," *Scientific Monthly*, XXX (February, 1930), 141-48.

¹¹ Broome, *The Living Wilderness*, V (1940), 13.

¹² Aldo Leopold, "Origin and Ideals of Wilderness Areas," *The Living Wilderness*, V (July, 1940), 7.

The original application of the wilderness concept occurred in 1919, followed by a second such step in 1921. These and other pertinent actions took place prior to and during the "incubation period" referred to by Leopold. Until July 12, 1929, when the Forest Service issued its "Regulation L-20: Primitive Areas," these areas were identified under the authority of the district foresters, and did not require the approval of the Washington office. Thus, they were subject to no uniform management plan.¹⁴ Regulation L-20 gave final authority for the creation of primitive areas to the chief of the Forest Service, and thus created the possibility of unified, nationwide protection of wilderness values in National Forests. Between 1929 and 1933, this opportunity was utilized to identify sixty-three potential primitive areas within the National Forests, and formally to establish eleven of them.¹⁵ It was not until 1939 that new regulations superseded that of 1929.¹⁶

Let us return now to the period just prior to the years 1919-1933 and assess the status of "recreation" in the National Forests of the United States. On the eve of World War I, Forest Service officials noted the increasing use of National Forests as playgrounds. The minutes of a forest supervisors' conference held in Denver from January 29 to February 3, 1917, gave significant evidence of the origin and growing awareness of the recreational uses of the National Forests among Forest Service personnel. The chairman of the conference was Smith Riley, the district forester. At the morning session on Wednesday, January 31, Q. R. Craft, the district fiscal agent, noted that "twelve years ago tomorrow" the Forest Service had been transferred from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture, and that in 1905 the rank and file had little grasp of what it meant. Of one thing he seemed certain, namely that "this western country is bound to increase wonderfully in population and that means that every Forest officer must advance and keep pace with the development and need of these Forest resources. . . ." ¹⁷ Between 1917 and the end of World

¹³ *Ibid.*, citing Aldo Leopold, "The Wilderness and Its Place in Forest Recreation Policy," *Journal of Forestry*, XIX (November, 1921), 718-21.

¹⁴ ORRRC, Study Report No. 3, p. 20.

¹⁵ See the "Copeland Report," published under the title *A National Plan for American Forestry: A Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture Transmitting the Report of the Forest Service on the Forest Problem of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), pp. 474-76.

¹⁶ ORRRC, Study Report No. 3, p. 21. These regulations were listed as U-1, U-2, and U-3, and remained in effect until 1964, when they were superseded by the Wilderness Act.

¹⁷ Minutes of the Supervisors' Meeting, January 29-February 3, 1917, District 2, United States Forest Service, Denver, pp. 118-19, Conservation Library Center, Denver Public Library.

War I, the Forest Service made an extended examination of the existing conditions of recreation. It was concluded that the forests should be made more accessible to visitors, and that the Forest Service should employ men suitably trained in landscape engineering.¹⁸

When the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, American troops became eager to return to their homes and their peacetime occupations. This group included First Lieutenant Arthur H. Carhart of the Sanitary Corps, United States Army, stationed at Camp Meade, Maryland. While still in the Washington, D. C., area in December of that year, he applied first to the National Park Service for employment as a landscape architect, but without success. Then he visited the main office of the Forest Service in the United States Department of Agriculture where he made the acquaintance of Edward A. Sherman, the assistant forester, who, like Carhart, was a graduate of Iowa State College.¹⁹

Carhart's background to 1918 had been unexceptional. He was born September 18, 1892, at Mapleton, Iowa, where he was educated in the public schools. In June, 1916, he was graduated from Iowa State College with a Bachelor of Science degree in landscape architecture. When he entered the army in September, 1917, he had acquired approximately thirteen months of experience in greenhouses, nurseries, and related landscape operations, including a summer with the Shaw Botanical Garden at St. Louis, Missouri.²⁰

Sherman accorded the applicant a warm reception, but having no specific openings to offer, suggested that Carhart correspond directly with the various district offices of the Forest Service to determine their possible need for a landscape architect. Following a series of letters and examinations, the forester approved the plan of securing a recreational engineer for the Denver office at a beginning salary of eighteen hundred dollars per annum. From his home in Mapleton, Carhart accepted the appointment, agreeing to report to Denver at his own expense on March 1, 1919, to take up his duties as the first

recreational engineer to be employed by the Forest Service on a full-time, permanent basis.²¹

By May, 1919, news of the work that Recreation Engineer Carhart had undertaken began to circulate throughout the Rocky Mountain Region of what was then District 2 (now Region 2) of the Forest Service, an area embracing some twenty-three million acres.²² In what was probably his first article boosting recreation in the National Forests, Carhart wrote in May, 1919:

Recreation plans for the Forests of the District are getting a real start toward a comprehensive development plan. Not a surprising lot will be accomplished this season perhaps but the important thing, the beginning of a full utilization of Forest Recreation, commenced.²³

The "beauty engineer," as Carhart was quickly dubbed,²⁴ meanwhile continued to maintain contact with his friend Sherman in Washington. In reply to a letter from Carhart, Sherman wrote that he was very glad indeed to hear that conditions appeared favorable to the development of recreation in the National Forests in both Colorado and Wyoming, adding:

I was particularly interested in your scheme for developing a system of camps for the city of Pueblo. The idea seems to me to be an excellent one and will no doubt meet with the approval of all persons who are able to visit the camps by automobile whether they be residents of Pueblo or of the plains country to the eastward. . . .²⁵

In the meantime, Carhart was working out "the system of camps" and was in the process of writing a sixty-four-page report which he called "General Working Plan, Recreational Development of the San Isabel National Forest, Colorado," com-

Motoring through the San Isabel National Forest in 1920.



¹⁸ Frank A. Waugh, *Recreation Uses on the National Forests* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 37. Waugh was head of the School of Landscape Engineering at Dartmouth College and a personal friend of Assistant Forester Edward A. Sherman of the Forest Service in Washington.

¹⁹ Letter from Carhart to Sherman, February 12, 1919, Arthur H. Carhart Papers, Conservation Library Center, Denver Public Library. Hereafter referred to as Carhart Papers.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

plete with attached maps of the locality.²⁶ Beginning in 1919 with this and other reports, articles, and letters, Carhart's writings seemed to pyramid. In drafting the San Isabel plan Carhart stated that it was "the first great regional plan that has been undertaken anywhere in the National Forests and it is bound to be a model for other like plans that will inevitably follow. . . ."²⁷

In that year also, when he became a truly itinerant recreation engineer, Carhart made a survey of the Superior National Forest in Minnesota. He traveled through the country now called the Boundary Waters Canoe Area by canoe, as did the early



French *voyageurs* and *coureurs de bois*.²⁸ On this trip he made observations and took photographs and extensive notes for the Forest Service. He embodied his findings in a preliminary report

²¹ Letter from Sherman to Carhart, February 8, 1919, Carhart Papers.

²² It is noteworthy that District 2 at that time enclosed the National Forests located in Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska, South Dakota, northern Michigan, and Minnesota. On May 1, 1919, the Secretary of Agriculture approved a change in the official designation of the nine Forest Service districts, the district foresters, and other district officers, so that "region" and "regional" superseded the term "district." U. S., Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, *Report of the Forester to the Secretary of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1930* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 14.

²³ A. H. Carhart, "Your Scenic Attractions," *The Bulletin: District 2*, III (May, 1919), 12.

²⁴ Interview with A. H. Carhart, October 9, 1964.

²⁵ Letter from Sherman to Carhart, July 10, 1919, Carhart Papers. The citizens of Pueblo used private funds to build the camps referred to by Sherman.

²⁶ A. H. Carhart, "General Working Plan, Recreational Development of the San Isabel National Forest, Colorado," December, 1919, Carhart Papers. See also A. H. Carhart, "Municipal Playgrounds in the Forests," *Municipal Facts*, II (July, 1919), 7, 14, which heralded the fact that the Denver office of the Forest Service was the first to receive a recreation engineer and that "Colorado towns thus receive mountain parks."

²⁷ Carhart, *Municipal Facts*, II (1919), 1.

²⁸ Grace L. Nute's *Caesars of the Wilderness* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1943), describes early voyages by canoe and portage in this area.

of 117 pages, with 85 pages of lively text and 32 magnificent photographs, carefully identified.²⁹

The report itself might warrant complete reproduction here because it stated so well Carhart's position, but limitations of space permit reference to only some of the salient points. Under the title "Preservation" Carhart asserted that the "first logical step" in any work of this type is to "plan for preservation and protection of all of those things that are of values great enough to sacrifice a certain amount of economic return so there may be a greater total return from the aesthetic qualities."³⁰

This step was discussed under such additional headings as "Game," "Timber," "Portage," and "Ownership." That the plan was practical and yet provided for wilderness protection through the exclusion of roads in the forest, was shown under a section headed "Accessibility."³¹ (It should be noted that these proposals were made in 1919.) As Carhart remarked: "Suffice it to say that good auto roads lead to the edge of this plan at many points, that railways touch the border in such a manner that they can carry much traffic to the borders of the [planned area]. . . ."³² He then added that the plan "does not take rank with the mere placing of camp sites. It goes far beyond that." Carhart further explained that in order to get "full return" from the forest areas, in order to "correlate uses" so there will be no interference resulting in loss to the nation, and in order that "this National Forest shall have its development based on sound foundations of a size commensurate with the importance of its recreation possibilities, it is imperative that the planning reach what may be known for want of a better term as Forest Regional Planning."³³

The year 1919 was indeed a banner one for the Forest Service and for the state of Colorado. In the summer of that year, Arthur Carhart was assigned to make a survey of the Trappers Lake area in the White River National Forest of Colorado. The purpose of the survey was to plot several hundred summer home sites on the lake shore and to plan a through road around the lake. During July, 1919, operating out of what was then Scott Teague's Camp located at the outlet of Trappers Lake, Carhart laid survey lines around the lake according to

²⁹ A. H. Carhart, "Preliminary Report, Recreation Reconnaissance, Superior National Forest, Minnesota, 1919," Carhart Papers.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 76.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 77.

³² *Ibid.*, 78.

³³ *Ibid.*, 79.



The quiet waters of Trappers Lake mirror the famous Flat Tops.

his instructions. It seems that Paul J. Rainey and William McFadden were guests of Teague at this time, so Carhart had a chance to meet them there. After a series of spirited talks together, Rainey and McFadden persuaded Carhart that the Forest Service should keep Trappers Lake in a wild-land condition.³⁴ Carhart, in turn, then translated the idea into a functional plan through his landscape architectural training and his basic orientation toward nature and the unspoiled wilderness.

Upon his return to the district office in Denver, Carhart furnished his immediate supervisor, Carl J. Stahl, not only with the completed surveys but also with the unsolicited comment that he opposed the plan of making homesites on the lake shore. After some discussion, Stahl agreed with him that the Trappers Lake area should remain roadless and that the many applications for homesite permits around the lake should not be honored. This was an unprecedented step in Forest Service history; it marked the first *de facto* application of the wilderness concept.³⁵

By 1919 the backlog of applications for summer homesites³⁶ had begun to plague the district office in Denver. To men like

Stahl, Carhart's opposition to developing the Trappers Lake area merited further study and discussion with others in the Service who had similar problems. One such man was Aldo Leopold who, after hearing Stahl tell about the policy employed at Trappers Lake, became interested and wanted more information about it. Accordingly, Stahl arranged for Leopold and Carhart to hold a conference. Leopold visited the Denver district office on December 6, 1919, and met Carhart there. Following the day-long discussion, Leopold requested Carhart to reduce to writing some of the salient points which had been covered. What was then simply a "memorandum for Mr. Leopold, District 3" became one of the most significant records in the history of the wilderness concept.³⁷

Scrutinized from the perspective of almost half a century, the full import of the document can be realized. As Carhart pointed out, the purpose of the four-page memorandum was to "supplement some conversation between myself and Mr. Leopold. . . . The problem spoken of in this conversation was, how far shall the Forest Service carry or allow to be carried man-made improvements in scenic territories, and whether there is not a definite point where all such developments . . . shall stop."³⁸ In considering this question, Carhart stated:

There is a limit to the number of lands of shore line on the lakes; there is a limit to the number of lakes in existence; there is a limit to the mountainous areas of the world, and . . . there are portions of natural scenic beauty which are God made, and . . . which of a right should be the property of all people. . . . In Colorado . . . the great canon of the Big Thompson represents the case where private holdings defeat the beauties of the canon. . . . For me the aesthetic value . . . has been reduced not less than eighty percent. . . .³⁹

The next paragraph contained the elements underlying the national wilderness preservation system. Carhart declared:

I have jotted down four different types of areas which should not contain summer homes, perhaps no camp sites, and other like developments. First of these is the superlative area; the second is the area unsuited for any camp and summer home development, such as the high ridge of a mountain range; third is the area which should be preserved for the group rather

³⁴ Interview with A. H. Carhart, September 23, 1963. Paul J. Rainey brought the first motion pictures of African wildlife to the United States, and William McFadden loaned money to Ernest W. Marland for the first Marland oil well at Ponca City, Oklahoma.

³⁵ District Forester Allen S. Peck approved the plan by attaching a handwritten note to the proposal. Undated note to Carhart from Peck, Carhart Papers.

³⁶ Congress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to grant permits "for the construction of summer homes, hotels, stores, or other structures, needed for recreation or public convenience," by Public Law 63-293, approved March 4, 1915. U.S., *Statutes at Large*, XXXVIII, ch. 144.

³⁷ A. H. Carhart, "Memorandum for Mr. Leopold, District 3," December 10, 1919, Carhart Papers.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

than the individual, such as lake shores, stream banks, or such a natural feature as medicinal springs; fourth group would include areas not in these three groups, but which represent those God made and of the greatest use for preservation of any owned by the Government. There is no question in my mind but what there is a definite point in different types of country where man made structures should be stopped.⁴⁰

The remainder of the memorandum was devoted to suggesting plans aimed at defining both the stopping point and the areas which should be preserved. Carhart believed that the whole responsibility could be undertaken by the Forest Service. Alternatively, the Forest Service might ask the state to appoint an art commission or the national society might name a committee to study rural planning and landscape architecture, which could cooperate with the Service nationwide. Finally, Carhart remarked that "the question of how best to do this is perhaps the real question, rather than shall it be done."⁴¹ Here was a concept that was new to the world, and it was first proposed in 1919 by Arthur Carhart of the Denver office, United States Forest Service—several years ahead of his contemporaries.

Subsequent developments at Trappers Lake were affected by the fact that the 1919 policy approved by District Forester A. S. Peck for the region was continued throughout the 1920's. Evidence to support that claim is found in the restricted applications for homesites, and in the cancellation of permits for sites already surveyed.⁴² In addition, several permits for cabins built in 1916, 1917, and 1920 were canceled and the cabins destroyed. The following quotation from the notes of Forest Examiner Fred R. Johnson is most explicit:

From my field notes it is evident that we [Forest Supervisor Lewis R. Rist, Assistant Forest Supervisor Karl L. Janouch, and Johnson] concluded that the area above Trappers Lake should be reserved for wilderness purposes. This was further corroborated by later findings in the Supervisor's Office at Glenwood Springs [in] a letter from Regional Forester Allen S. Peck to Supervisor James Blair, under date of Oct 12, 1923, stating that the Forest Service should not plan to continue the road beyond its terminus at Forest Inn (¼ mile below Trappers Lake).⁴³

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 3. The difficulty of defining "stopping points" has remained a central problem.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁴² Handwritten note by Fred R. Johnson, forest examiner, District 2, Denver, July 29, 1958, citing his diary and field notes for the period June 17, 1929, through June 27, 1929, Conservation Library Center, Denver Public Library.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Formal establishment of the Flat Tops Primitive Area under Regulation L-20 began when Forest Supervisor Rist, who replaced James A. Blair in 1928, approved the recreation management plan for the White River National Forest on December 17, 1929. He then forwarded it to Washington, where on March 5, 1932, the Flat Tops Primitive Area was granted final approval by the chief of the Forest Service, R. Y. Stuart.⁴⁴ The area has been managed since 1932 under Regulation L-20 and is currently (1965-1967) being studied for reclassification to wilderness status, pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964.⁴⁵

The second *de facto* application of the wilderness concept in the United States took place in the Superior National Forest in Minnesota. Its origin may be traced to Carhart's preliminary report of 1919; it was advanced a step further when in 1921 Carhart paid a second visit to that forest and drafted a second, or revised, report. The 1921 "Recreation Plan, Superior National Forest, Minnesota," consisted of 144 pages, complete with photographic illustrations and maps of the area.⁴⁶ It was "dedicated

Traveling through the Superior National Forest reinforced Carhart's belief that saving the wilderness was imperative in modern America.



to the ideal of human service and to the purpose of making Americans of greater mind, body and soul, and through them preserve our national life from disintegration because of its oppressing association with man-made, artificial life."⁴⁷

Under "Wilderness Spirit," a heading which has direct bearing on this study, Carhart reiterated that there was "so little wilderness left where natural conditions are supreme that the Superior stands somewhat by itself in this type."⁴⁸ One final quotation should suffice to indicate his central concept: "The whole place should be kept as near wilderness as possible, the wilderness feature being developed rather than any urban conditions."⁴⁹

Out of this plan came the first major disagreement over road building in National Forests;⁵⁰ this dispute concerned the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Review Committee reported to Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman in December, 1964, that the first attempt to indicate and to develop guiding principles for that area was made in 1919 when Arthur H. Carhart was employed as a landscape architect for the Forest Service.⁵¹ It should be noted that Carhart's carbon copy of the plan discussed immediately above was clearly marked "1921," the year of his second visit, but that Region 9 of the Forest Service in Milwaukee and the Washington office referred to the document as Carhart's "1922" report. For example, a letter from the Washington office to Region 9, written in 1955, stated: "We have the original copy of Mr. Arthur Carhart's report entitled 'Recreation Plan, Superior National Forest' submitted May, 1922 and approved by District Forester Peck on November 8, 1922."⁵² That statement, in itself, constitutes irrevocable evidence that Carhart's plan

was formally approved two years before the one proposed by Aldo Leopold. Leopold's plan for the Gila National Forest was not formally approved until June 3, 1924.⁵³

Carhart's 1919 and 1921 reports regarding the Superior, after some seven to nine years of seeming to be dormant, had in reality remained quite alive. They had stood the test of time. A letter to Carhart from the assistant district forester, District 2, in Denver, dated February 23, 1928, brought out this point:

Contrary to your impression, the recreation plan you conceived for the Superior has not been allowed to accumulate dust but rather has been a very live document and as time has gone by has formed the basis for the preparation of the controlling plan governing recreation and other activities within that Forest. While the wording in that plan may not be identical with that used by you, yet the fundamental policies are the same, which I presume will be the source of some satisfaction to you. . . . I believe our present plan provides for the utmost in coordinated use and for the ultimate development for the most attractive recreation ground that will meet with your ideas, to a large extent, of the full capitalization of the social value of a Forest of this character.⁵⁴

Moreover, in the report of the forester for the year 1928, newly-appointed Chief Forester R. Y. Stuart remarked that "the study of the so-called 'wilderness areas' or areas believed to be most useful if retained in a condition of relative undevelopment, continued throughout the year, and in one district was completed."⁵⁵

The foregoing reference to the study of the so-called "wilderness areas" that had continued throughout the year, and that "in one district was completed," failed to state that an area or areas had been established or designated. To that year, 1928, the only area which had come to the attention of the Washington office of the Forest Service and to the Secretary of Agriculture had been the border lake country in the Superior National Forest. Acting Forester Sherman had approved the recreation plan for the Superior National Forest, June 30, 1926, and that plan was given final approval by Secretary of Agriculture Jardine on September 17, 1926.⁵⁶ The files of the Gila National

⁴⁴ "Recreation Management Plan, White River National Forest," December 17, 1929, regional office, Region 2, U.S. Forest Service, Denver. It was formally approved by Chief Forester R. Y. Stuart March 5, 1932.

⁴⁵ *Denver Post*, October 9, 1966.

⁴⁶ A. H. Carhart, "Recreation Plan, Superior National Forest, Minnesota, 1921," Carhart Papers.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁵⁰ "History," Report of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Review Committee, Duluth, Minnesota, December 15, 1964, p. 4 (in the files of the regional office, Region 9, U.S. Forest Service, Milwaukee, Wisconsin).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 5. See also letter from Sherman to P. B. Riis, secretary, Department of Wild Life Preservation, American Institute of Park Executives, Rockford, Illinois, February 13, 1923, Carhart Papers.

⁵² Letter (U-Recreation), from the U.S. Forest Service, Washington, to the regional office, Region 9, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, November 18, 1955. Assistant Forester H. A. Svensen of Region 9 has stated that the issue of whether or not Carhart's report had ever received formal approval arose in 1955 when that regional office attempted to write a history of its development. Interview with Svensen, February 3, 1965.

⁵³ The "Recreational Working Plan, Gila National Forest," was submitted March 28, 1924, and approved by District Forester F. C. W. Pooler on June 3, 1924, Region 3, U.S. Forest Service, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

⁵⁴ Letter from E. W. Tinker, assistant district forester, District 2, to Carhart, February 23, 1928, Carhart Papers.

⁵⁵ U.S., Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, *Report of the Forester to the Secretary of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1928* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928), pp. 38-39.

⁵⁶ The Superior Wilderness Area report, approved June 27, 1938, by Acting Chief Forester Earle H. Clapp, contained the following statement: "The

Forest, District 3, Albuquerque, New Mexico, reflected no coordination with the Washington office of the Secretary of Agriculture between 1924 and 1928 concerning the "wilderness area" in that Forest.⁵⁷

The movement to establish wilderness areas which began in District 2 during mid-1919 had come to the attention of Assistant District Forester Leopold, District 3, in that year. Again in the late summer of 1921 while Carhart was still writing his plan of management for the Superior National Forest, Leopold visited the Denver district office of the Forest Service and the two men talked for several hours about wilderness preservation in National Forests. Yet it was not until late 1921 that Leopold began writing on this subject.⁵⁸ His first article dealing with the wilderness concept was published in November, 1921. There followed a hiatus of four years. His next published articles on the subject of the wilderness appeared in 1925. In October, 1922, Leopold prepared a three-page proposal,⁵⁹ in outline form, for the establishment of a wilderness area within the Gila National Forest; this was the first written proposal for wilderness preservation in District 3 of the Forest Service. Leopold's proposal did not become a burning issue in District 3, as may be seen by the casual handling it received; it was routed inadvertently to the files without action by other district officials and was not read until February 5, 1923.⁶⁰ The proposal was written in final form by staff members and submitted for approval March 28, 1924. On June 3, 1924, District Forester Frank C. W. Pooler gave his approval, and Leopold left the district the following June 15.⁶¹ This marked the third *de facto* application of the wilderness principle.

Superior Wilderness Area approved by Acting Forester E. A. Sherman, June 30, 1926, was given final approval by Secretary of Agriculture September 17, 1926." Interview with H. A. Svensen, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 12, 1965, and letter from Svensen to author, April 14, 1965.

⁵⁷ Interview with Regional Forester Fred H. Kennedy, Region 3, and Norman P. Weeden, chief, recreation branch, division of recreation and lands, Region 3, U.S. Forest Service, Albuquerque, November 4, 1964. I also examined the active files of the Gila National Forest in Albuquerque as well as the dead files pertaining to the Forest dated November 12, 1964, FRC Containers 8264 and 37098, Federal Center, Denver.

⁵⁸ See footnote 13. His publications from 1920 through 1925 were predominantly short articles on ornithology, hunting and game management, erosion control, ecological consequences of forest fires, and the one on wilderness values.

⁵⁹ Aldo Leopold, "Report on Proposed Wilderness Areas (L Recreation, Gila, Wilderness Area)," District 3, U.S. Forest Service, October 2, 1922, Federal Center, Denver. It is noteworthy that Aldo Leopold's initials or signature appear on no other documents related to the Gila Wilderness Area after October 2, 1922, although he is referred to in the third person after that time. He left District 3 on June 15, 1924, for Madison, Wisconsin.

⁶⁰ "Memorandum (L Recreation, Gila, Wilderness Area), for Mr. Pooler," District 3, Albuquerque, March 1, 1923, Federal Center, Denver.

⁶¹ Copy of undated handwritten note from Zane G. Smith, staff member, District 3, to Rex King, assistant district forester, District 3, Albuquerque.

There is no need to rehearse here the complicated legal procedure involved in the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964, but some of its implications for the future of the nation's wilderness areas should be noted. Having secured the necessary legislation to convert *de facto* wilderness areas into *de jure* ones, has the fight been won? As the late Howard Zahnizer noted when passage of the Wilderness Act seemed assured: "We are establishing for the first time in the history of the earth a program, a national policy, whereby areas of wilderness can be preserved. That will not be the end of our efforts. That is just the beginning."⁶²

More recently, Stewart M. Brandborg, executive director of the Wilderness Society, wrote that when President Lyndon B. Johnson approved the Wilderness Bill on September 3, 1964, he "brought to a successful culmination one of the nation's longest and most hard-fought conservation battles." Brandborg also emphasized that an important part of the programs under the act would be "development of plans" which would provide for "various uses of wilderness areas without impairing the natural environment or wild character of the lands involved," features which were provided by Arthur H. Carhart's recreational plans almost half a century ago.⁶³

Still more recently President Johnson, in a message transmitting the Wilderness Act, remarked in part:

. . . Only in our country have such positive measures been taken to preserve the wilderness adequately for its scenic and spiritual beauty. . . . In the new conservation of this century, our concern is with the total relation between man and world around him. . . . Generations of Americans to come will enjoy a finer and more meaningful life because of these actions taken in these times.⁶⁴

This view has now become widely accepted. But in the decade of the 1920's it was a distinctly minority position emanating from Colorado.

It would appear that among the men who were ahead of

This was, however, in response to an inquiry initiated by the Washington office by "Memorandum (U-Recreation, R-3, Gila, Gila Wilderness Area; I-Cooperation, Wilderness Society)," October 13, 1948. Aldo Leopold died of a heart attack near his summer home at Baraboo, Wisconsin, April 21, 1948, after two hours of fighting a bad grass fire on a neighbor's land. Paul L. Errington, "In Appreciation of Aldo Leopold," *Journal of Wildlife Management*, XII (October, 1948), 341-50.

⁶² Howard Clinton Zahnizer, "The People and Wilderness," *The Living Wilderness*, No. 86 (Spring-Summer, 1964), 41.

⁶³ Stewart M. Brandborg, "The Job Ahead Under the Wilderness Act," *The Living Wilderness*, No. 86 (Spring-Summer, 1964), 13.

⁶⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson, "Message from the President of the United States Transmitting National Wilderness Preservation System," reprinted in *The Living Wilderness*, No. 87 (Winter, 1964-65), 2.



their time in planning for recreational development and the preservation of wilderness areas in our National Forests, Arthur H. Carhart was in the front rank. Surely it would seem reasonable to conclude from the evidence that if Gifford Pinchot was the "father of the Forest Service," then Arthur Carhart might be considered among the most eligible candidates for the title "father of the wilderness concept."

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Prelude to Industrial Warfare: The Colorado City Strike

BY GEORGE G. SUGGS, JR.

Few governors of Colorado ever became more entangled in labor problems than James H. Peabody. During his administration (1903-1905), he allowed himself to be drawn into strikes called by the Western Federation of Miners. Too readily he granted the mill and mineowners' requests for the Colorado National Guard to crush the union. His partisan use of power caused intense controversy and embittered labor relations for a decade.

Various factors shaped Governor Peabody's response to the strikes of the Federation. As a successful Canon City businessman, he shared the hostility of the business community toward militant unions threatening the status quo. The Federation was such an organization. For a decade its name was synonymous with violence in Colorado.¹ Peabody believed that the state's history of labor strife had diverted eastern capital elsewhere. In his inaugural address, he pledged to make Colorado safe for investments by using all available power to protect lives and property.² Furthermore, newspaper reports of the Federation's annual conventions in 1901 and 1902 had pictured the organization as a revolutionary body, working for the overthrow of the existing system.³ Businessmen saw the miners' union as a threat to their positions of dominance and power, as well as to democratic institutions, private property, and the nation. For these reasons, when Peabody entered office, he was predisposed to


¹ See U.S., Congress, Senate, Commissioner of Labor, *A Report on Labor Disturbances in the State of Colorado, from 1880 to 1904, Inclusive with Correspondence Relating Thereto*. 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1905, Doc. 122, pp. 75-111. Hereafter cited as *Labor Disturbances*.

² Colorado, General Assembly, House, *House Journal*, 14th Sess., 1903, p. 99.
³ See Western Federation of Miners, *Official Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Convention* (Pueblo: Pueblo Courier Print, 1901) and *Official Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention* (Denver: Colorado Chronicle Press, 1902), *passim*, for the convention's drift toward militancy, socialism, and political action.

act forcefully against the Federation. The strike of the Mill and Smelters' Union No. 125, WFM, of Colorado City against three processing companies first revealed the outline of the Governor's labor policy.

Three corporations, the United States Reduction and Refining Company, the Portland Gold Mining Company, and the Telluride Reduction Company, had constructed smelting and reduction plants in Colorado City to process ore from the Cripple Creek mining district. Unable to prevent the Federation from organizing the millworkers in August, 1902, company officials determined to emasculate the union in any way possible.

Dissension first arose in the Standard Mill of the USRRC.



There the workers alleged that the firm's employment and discharge policies were discriminatory and designed to oust union men. Labor leaders claimed that forty-two men had been fired because they dared to join the union. However, mill officials denied this charge by asserting that only "incompetents" had been released. Union employees maintained, nevertheless, that the company's hiring and firing procedures challenged their right to organize and threatened the life of their organization.⁴

On February 14, 1903, a committee called upon Charles M. MacNeill, vice president and general manager of the USRRC,

to voice the union's grievances and to present several wage proposals. When he discovered that no employee was present, MacNeill abruptly terminated the meeting and refused to accept a written statement outlining the union's position. In his opinion, any proposal by nonemployees was equivalent to an "ultimatum" and was an "unwarrantable" interference in company affairs.⁵ That union employees had chosen the committee as their bargaining agent was immaterial.

Moderation characterized the rejected memorandum. It requested that the minimum wage for an eight-hour day be raised from \$1.80 to \$2.25, and that small upward revisions be made in the wages of employees already earning more than the proposed minimum but below the \$3.00 per day. The remainder of the memorandum was a plea for the USRRC to recognize labor's right to organize and maintain a union in its mills. It emphasized that organization was essential to counteract the unfavorable attitude of the courts toward labor on matters of industrial injuries and company liability. Though there was no objection raised to the discharge of incompetent union workers, the statement deplored the firing of men for alleged incompetency when the true reason was their union membership.⁶

The union reacted to MacNeill's refusal to negotiate by calling a strike on the evening of February 14. Seventy-six of 212 left the mill, but of these only 40 were members of the union. From the beginning, there was close cooperation between county law enforcement officers and company officials. Though picket lines were established, the Standard Mill continued limited production, protected by deputy sheriffs under W. R. Gilbert, sheriff of El Paso County. Gilbert appointed MacNeill deputy sheriff for the duration of the strike, and the USRRC temporarily paid the salaries of the men protecting its properties until the county could make arrangements to absorb the costs.⁷

The strike was not limited to the USRRC. On February 14 the union committee also visited Frank G. Peck, secretary-treasurer of the Portland Gold Mining Company, and Hugh W. Fullerton, general manager of the Telluride Reduction Company who, unlike MacNeill, accepted and agreed to consider the memorandum. Two weeks later their rejection of the recommended

⁵ Charles M. MacNeill to Peabody, March 8, 1903, Colorado State Archives and Records Service, Records of the Office of the Governor: James H. Peabody, 1903-1905, Correspondence: DB Correspondence and Investigation of Strikes: 1903-1904. Cited hereafter as Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes.

⁶ Enc., William D. Haywood to Peabody, March 8, 1903, *ibid.*

⁷ *Labor Disturbances*, p. 113.

⁴ *Labor Disturbances*, p. 112.

wage increases caused the executive board of the Federation, then meeting in Denver, to declare their companies "unfair" and to authorize strikes against them, commencing on February 28.⁸ Thus, by the end of the month strikes were in progress against all the mills in Colorado City and slightly more than sixty per cent of 535 employees were involved.

The situation rapidly deteriorated as mill officials resorted to strikebreakers. These were not all temporary replacements, for the USRRC employed men with the understanding that they had permanent jobs as long as they performed satisfactory service. Their hiring rested on the premise that the strikers had severed all relations with the company.⁹ This situation left the men on strike without jobs, made their union meaningless, and made reconciliation more difficult.

Conditions were ideal for trouble. Picket lines and an ever-increasing number of deputies moved about outside the mills. Incidents were inevitable. Reports circulated of alleged assaults on the strikebreakers by members of the Federation and of brutal attacks on the strikers by the deputies. Company officials reacted by demanding additional protection for their mills and employees until Sheriff Gilbert soon had deputized over 70 men. But the operators wanted more protection. On March 3 MacNeill insisted that union threats and actual violence made imperative the stationing of 250 men around the properties of the USRRC.¹⁰ Gilbert received other demands for increased protection from the Portland and Telluride companies, as well as from the Colorado Electric Company which supplied power to the mills.¹¹ Unable to satisfy these demands, he turned to Denver.

On March 3 Governor Peabody conferred with MacNeill and several associates in Denver regarding the Colorado City situation. MacNeill presented Sheriff Gilbert's official petition for the National Guard to aid in suppressing alleged mob violence and in upholding law in El Paso County. It certified the existence of a riot in Colorado City and the presence of men who threatened lives and property. Included as corroborat-

ing evidence were letters from MacNeill and Peck to the sheriff demanding further protection.¹² Gilbert requested immediate action from the Governor, although he later testified that troops had been necessary not to suppress existing violence but to prevent its outbreak with a possible loss of life.¹³ It is clear that the companies exerted extraordinary pressures upon Gilbert, forcing him to request the Guard. Conspicuous by their absence were supporting affidavits from nonunion workers said to have been the victims of assault.

The Denver conference forced Governor Peabody, perhaps too early in his administration, to make a crucial decision certain to alienate either labor or management. Because MacNeill and his associates represented several important corporations and had the support of the chief law enforcement officer of one of the state's most populous counties, the Governor could not refuse them a courteous reception. Nor was he disposed to do so. Here was an opportunity to uphold his inaugural pledge to make Colorado a safe place for investments by a decisive use of executive powers.

Though the petitioners were involved in the dispute, Governor Peabody did not think it essential before reaching a decision to investigate or to provide union leaders with an opportunity of conferring with him about the necessity for troops. His inclination to act in behalf of the companies destroyed any doubts regarding the reliability of the evidence on hand. He needed only assurance of his unquestioned authority to intervene.

Attorney General Nathan C. Miller provided that assurance.



Attorney General Nathan C. Miller supported Governor Peabody in calling out the militia.

⁸ For Peck's and Fullerton's views of their meeting with the committee, see Peck to Peabody, March 8, 1903, and Fullerton to Peabody, March 9, 1903, Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes.

⁹ Testimony of MacNeill to Peabody's Advisory Board, March 28, 1903, "Stenographic Report of Proceedings of Advisory Board Appointed by Governor James H. Peabody to Investigate and Report upon Labor Difficulties Existing in the State of Colorado and More Particularly at Colorado City," Idaho Historical Society, Boise (microfilm). Hereafter cited as "Report of Advisory Board."

¹⁰ MacNeill to Gilbert, March 3, 1903, Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes.

¹¹ Peck to Gilbert, March 2, 1903, and Gilbert to Peabody, March 3, 1903, *ibid.*

Following a brief examination of Sheriff Gilbert's petition, Miller handed his opinion to the Governor in a letter of March 3, the date of the conference. In his judgment, the conditions certified by Gilbert warranted using the militia because the sheriff could not control the situation with available forces. Conditions in Colorado City imposed a constitutional and statutory obligation upon the Governor to act in support of law and order.¹⁴

Confident that intervention would bear legal scrutiny, Governor Peabody ordered Adjutant General Sherman M. Bell to mobilize the necessary units of the Guard to assist Sheriff Gilbert in enforcing the laws and the constitution of Colorado. He made no reference to the strike. Before the end of March 3 infantry companies from Colorado Springs had stationed themselves around the Standard Mill of the USRRC, and additional



A STRONGHOLD IN THE HILLS ABOVE THE STANDARD MILL.

troops were en route from Denver to the strike zone. For seventeen days, more than three hundred soldiers "protected" corporate property and escorted nonunion employees to and from work.¹⁵

¹² Gilbert to Peabody, March 3, 1903, *ibid.*

¹³ Testimony of Gilbert to Advisory Board, April 1, 1903, "Report of Advisory Board."

¹⁴ Miller to Peabody, March 3, 1903, Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes. Miller based his opinion on Art. 4, Sec. 5, of the Colorado Constitution (1903) and Art. 7, Sec. 3, National Guard Act (1897).

¹⁵ Colorado, Office of the Adjutant General, *Biennial Report to the Governor, 1903-1904*, p. 11.



Adjutant General Sherman Bell's National Guard units were sent to the strike zone to preserve law and order.

Governor Peabody's order provoked immediate opposition. The officials of Colorado City did not support Sheriff Gilbert's request for troops; their sympathies were with the strikers.¹⁶ Upon hearing that the Guard had been sent, the mayor, the chief of police, and the city attorney protested, wiring the Governor that a "few occasional brawls" did not justify a military occupation.¹⁷ On March 4, a delegation presented a petition from more than 125 residents of Colorado City which denied the necessity for intervention. The signers claimed that there had been no violence other than "petty quarrels," which were easily controlled by local officials. Furthermore, there was no expectation of imminent "riots," for the strikers were among the "best citizens and old residents of El Paso County" who believed in law and order. Because troops were unnecessary, the signers of the petition wanted them withdrawn.¹⁸

Charles Moyer, president of the Western Federation of Miners, publicly condemned Governor Peabody for acting without a "personal investigation of conditions" and for failing to hear labor's side of the controversy. In his opinion, the Governor had thrown the "armed machinery" of the state into the dispute on behalf of the corporations without sufficient justification.¹⁹ Despite the protests, the troops remained.

The Governor had his supporters, however. During the five months following his order of March 3, he responded to forty-five letters commending his course of action. Only a few persons

¹⁶ MacNeill to Gilbert, March 3, 1903, Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes.

¹⁷ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), March 4, 1903.

¹⁸ Petition from citizens of Colorado City to Peabody, March 3, 1903, Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes.

¹⁹ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), March 4, 1903.

sent critical letters. The Governor took obvious pleasure in having the support of men such as J. A. Kebler, president of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, and M. D. Thatcher, president of the First National Bank of Pueblo.²⁰ These men were among the hundreds of businessmen who supported the administration, and who flocked into employers' organizations such as the Citizens' Alliances.

Ominously, the strike threatened to embroil the Cripple Creek district, the richest mining area of the state, and the entire power of the Federation, the most powerful labor organization in the West. As early as February 17, Moyer had said in an interview with the *Rocky Mountain News* that the Cripple Creek miners would strike if necessary to block shipments of ore to any striking Colorado City mill. On the day of Peabody's order, union officials in the district asked the mineowners to halt their shipments to the mills. When the Mine Owners' Association refused on March 5, the Federation threatened to strike.

Paradoxically, the presence of the troops in Colorado City forced a greater involvement of the Federation if the strike was to be won. Military intervention was obviously not a solution to the strike problem, for it complicated matters and made a settlement more difficult unless Governor Peabody further involved himself. But the Governor had no intention of doing so, despite the gathering storm that threatened to disrupt Colorado's entire metalliferous industry. On March 7 the *Rocky Mountain News* quoted Peabody as saying:

I have done my full duty. I have taken steps for the preservation of life and property, and for the enforcement of the law. That is all I was asked to do. Taking a hand in the settlement of the strike is out of my jurisdiction. . . . I do not propose to have anything to do with the differences which prevail between the mill owners and their men, and will take no part in any negotiation which they may have as to wages or anything else.

Yet the formal machinery for preventing the growth of the strike was limited. Colorado had a State Board of Arbitration, but existing statutes ruled out compulsory arbitration. The board could not act unless requested to do so by one or more parties involved in a dispute.²¹ Partly because of this limitation, Governor Peabody had recommended its abolition in his inaugu-

ral address. He claimed that the board was ineffective and too expensive, and that the labor commissioner could satisfactorily perform its functions.²² Therefore, he refused to encourage the board's intervention in the Colorado City dispute without a formal request from the strikers or the companies.

Though his stand was legally correct, sending troops had made this "do-nothing-further" position untenable. Democratic newspapers, particularly the *News*,²³ severely criticized the administration for its failure to seek a settlement. Furthermore, a strike by the Cripple Creek miners seemed imminent. And though tabled without consideration, a petition of March 6 to the Colorado House from hundreds of El Paso County residents protesting the use of troops had increased the pressure.²⁴ MacNeill also helped to force Peabody's further involvement. When the *Denver Post* on March 6 pointedly asked whether he would "submit to arbitration" the dispute between his company and the men on strike, MacNeill flatly refused, stating that there was "no trouble between our company and mill workers employed by us. Our employees are now and have been perfectly satisfied with wages and treatment. Wages paid by us more and hours less than ore reducing plants with whom we compete.



Charles MacNeill insisted that his employees were "perfectly satisfied" with wages and working conditions.

²⁰ Peabody to Kebler, March 4, 1903, and Peabody to Thatcher, July 24, 1903, Peabody Papers: Letterpress Books 37 and 39, respectively.

²¹ Colorado, General Assembly, *Session Laws*, 11th Sess., 1897, pp. 22-27.

Our employees don't ask to arbitrate." In contrast, officials of the Federation in their statements to the press indicated a willingness to arbitrate the dispute.

Responding to the growing pressure, Governor Peabody wired MacNeill on March 7 that a Cripple Creek strike was avoidable if he would "only agree not to discriminate against union men." Would he publish such a statement or consent to arbitration by the State Board of Arbitration? If not, a strike of the Cripple Creek miners was inevitable and the results would be "deplorable."²⁵ Upon receipt of the telegram, MacNeill and Peck rushed to Denver, where they spent most of March 8 conferring with the Governor. Before adjourning, they asked that he have the Federation present a formal statement of its terms, and they in turn left position papers with him.

Intransigent, MacNeil restated his previous position on events of the past month. He also argued that any concession to the miners' union meant further trouble, for it interpreted concessions as weakness and this encouraged "intolerable" conditions.²⁶ Peck's statement was substantially the same. However, he was more precise on the subject of arbitration. Because his employees were satisfied, there was no one with "whom the company [could] arbitrate, for the company [had] no dealings whatsoever with any person who manifests or expresses any dissatisfaction with the present condition of affairs."²⁷ Fullerton of the Telluride company did not attend the conference, but next day he mailed a letter to the Governor stating his views. He simply insisted upon his right to employ the best men available regardless of whether or not they belonged to the union. He would not, however, tolerate any anarchistic tendencies among his employees, nor any discussion of labor, political, or religious matters which interfered with his mill operation.²⁸

On March 8 William D. Haywood, secretary-treasurer of the Federation, complied with Governor Peabody's request that he submit a statement of the union's terms for a settlement. These included an eight-hour day, the reinstatement of men discharged for their union membership, the end of discrimination against

union men, company recognition of the right of employees to affiliate with the Federation, acceptance of the wage proposals of February 14, and arbitration of the dispute by a board selected by all parties.²⁹ Next day the Governor relayed the terms to MacNeill, Peck, and Fullerton in identical letters.³⁰

Meanwhile, pressures for a peaceful settlement continued to build up. Apparently unaware of the Denver conference, both houses of the General Assembly concurred in a resolution of March 9 declaring it the "duty" of the union and the companies to submit statements of their differences either to the Governor, the State Board of Arbitration, or to another acceptable arbitrator so that a settlement could be reached.³¹ Mass meetings in Cripple Creek and Victor also called for a delay of the threatened miners' strike so that arrangements for arbitration might be made. The Federation conceded the delay.³² Moreover, labor leaders indicated to the press that they were willing to arbitrate, making it appear that only corporate officials blocked an immediate, peaceful settlement of the strike.

On March 11 Governor Peabody went to Colorado City for a personal investigation, conferring with Moyer en route. Upon arriving he talked with employees of the Standard Mill, municipal officials, officers of the Mill and Smeltermen's Union, and company officials. However, he refused to confer with the striking millworkers. At the Standard Mill Governor Peabody had a stenographic report made of his interviews with employees who expressed satisfaction with their jobs.³³ He did not visit the other mills. Nevertheless, nearly one hundred of the Portland workers forwarded a statement indicating an absence of grievances.³⁴ Not to be outdone, however, striking union members of the Telluride mill sent a statement expressing their dissatisfaction with both wages and conditions.³⁵

Governor Peabody concluded from his survey of conditions that the atmosphere of fear prevailing in Colorado City justified retaining troops there. However, he did not blame the Mill and Smeltermen's Union for the state of affairs, but placed responsibility upon other unnamed parties.³⁶ Despite his personal

²² Colorado, General Assembly, House, *House Journal*, 14th Sess., 1903, pp. 115-16.

²³ See editorials for March 6 and 7, 1903.

²⁴ Colorado, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Ninth Biennial Report, 1903-1904*, p. 56.

²⁵ Telegram from Peabody to MacNeill, March 7, 1903, Peabody Papers: Letterpress Book 37.

²⁶ MacNeill to Peabody, March 8, 1903, Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes.

²⁷ Peck to Peabody, March 8, 1903, *ibid.*

²⁸ Fullerton to Peabody, March 9, 1903, *ibid.*

²⁹ Haywood to Peabody, March 8, 1903, *ibid.*

³⁰ Peabody to MacNeill, Peck, and Fullerton, March 9, 1903, Peabody Papers: Letterpress Book 37.

³¹ Colorado, General Assembly, House, *House Journal*, 14th Sess., 1903, p. 785.

³² Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Ninth Biennial Report*, p. 56.

³³ Report on Governor Peabody's interviews with workers at the Standard Mill, March 11, 1903, Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes.

³⁴ Statement of Portland employees, March 12, 1903, *ibid.*

³⁵ Undated statement of striking Telluride employees, *ibid.*

³⁶ *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), March 13, 1903.

involvement, demands continued for arbitration. On March 12 a joint resolution of the General Assembly called upon the State Board of Arbitration to investigate the strike, find out why troops had been sent, and offer its services to settle the issues.³⁷

That same day Governor Peabody wrote letters to company officials and to Moyer requesting that they confer with him in Denver on March 14. His investigation, he wrote, had convinced him that he needed more information and that the proposed meeting was for his enlightenment. He emphasized that attendance would not represent any waiver of demands or concessions by the parties concerned.³⁸ All agreed to confer.

On the day preceding the conference, Governor Peabody received an advisory opinion from Attorney General Miller. Peabody had previously asked Miller what authority a governor possessed under the Arbitration Act of 1897 to compel employers and employees to arbitrate industrial disputes. The Attorney General advised on March 13 that compulsory arbitration was impossible under existing statutes. The governor could appoint an arbitration board, but it was powerless to act unless a dispute was voluntarily submitted for settlement.³⁹ Whatever plans Governor Peabody may have had to force arbitration ended, and he prepared for the worst. Upon Adjutant General Bell's recommendation, he asked Secretary of War Elihu Root whether an "allotment of Krag guns" was available to Colorado because a "serious strike was imminent."⁴⁰

The conference, comprising all parties and their attorneys, representatives of the General Assembly, the Adjutant General, the Attorney General, and the Governor, proved more successful than expected. Officials of the Portland and Telluride companies, breaking an earlier agreement with MacNeill to stand firm, came to terms with the Federation. Their agreements incorporated the Federation's proposals of March 9: an eight-hour day, guarantee of no discrimination, reinstatement of striking workers within twenty days, and a promise to confer with a union committee on wages. By March 23 the Portland and Telluride mills were completely unionized, the strikers resuming their jobs.⁴¹

³⁷ Colorado, General Assembly, House, *House Journal*, 14th Sess., 1903, pp. 846-47.

³⁸ Peabody to MacNeill, Peck, Fullerton, and Moyer, March 12, 1903, Peabody Papers: Letterpress Book 37.

³⁹ Miller to Peabody, March 13, 1903, Peabody Papers: DB Investigation of Strikes.

⁴⁰ Telegram from Peabody to Root, March 13, 1903, Peabody Papers: Letterpress Book 37.

⁴¹ Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Ninth Biennial Report*, p. 58.

MacNeill reacted to this development by withdrawing from the conference, but at the Governor's request he returned next day for further discussion. Negotiations broke down when he refused to discharge the men hired to replace the strikers and to discuss wages and union recognition. MacNeill, however, conceded the eight-hour day, already in effect in his Colorado City mills except in a few departments, and he promised not to discriminate in the future against union men. But union leaders rejected these concessions as unsatisfactory and the strike continued.⁴²

Governor Peabody's success in partially ending the strike proved awkward for his administration. Troops remained in Colorado City and their presence tended to validate charges that they served corporate interests. Yet the strike continued

Mushroom-shaped militia tents quickly sprouted up in the strike area.



against the USRRC, the company most responsible for military intervention. To complicate matters, on March 14 the Federation instigated a civil suit in El Paso County against officers of the Guard and Sheriff Gilbert, alleging unlawful violations of civil liberty and illegal seizure of property. The case threatened to force a public examination of the Governor's policies, for the union alleged that troops had been unnecessary and that they had been sent at the request of the USRRC to break the strike.

Pressures again forced Governor Peabody to act. When negotiations collapsed between MacNeill and the Federation, he reached an agreement with union officials regarding the troops. He promised to withdraw the Guard; they agreed to drop the suit against his military officers.⁴³ Minor disturbances and alarmist letters from his field commander, Brigadier General John Chase, and Sheriff Gilbert, neither of whom wanted the soldiers deactivated, delayed the withdrawal until March 19.

Before the recall occurred, however, an additional crisis developed. After MacNeill's refusal to accept Federation terms, Moyer had gone directly to the Cripple Creek district to confer with District Union No. 1, consisting of thirteen representatives of nine local unions. Among these were delegates of the Mill and Smeltermen's Union of Colorado City. On March 16 the District Union requested all mineowners to halt their ore shipments to the Colorado City and Florence mills of the USRRC. If they failed to comply, the miners would strike. It was now clear that the Federation intended to back up the demands of the millworkers against the USRRC by closing fourteen mines and pulling out nearly 1,750 miners, eighty per cent of whom were union men.⁴⁴ If all the mineowners rejected the request, forty to forty-five per cent of the Cripple Creek miners would strike.

District businessmen were thoroughly alarmed. The week-long moratorium granted by the union on March 8 had expired. On March 17 Nelson Franklin, mayor of Victor and president and general manager of the Eagle Ore Sampling Company, went to Colorado Springs with several associates to intercede with MacNeill. MacNeill again refused to arbitrate because, in his opinion, there was nothing to arbitrate with his satisfied employees. As for the men on strike, he agreed to re-employ them

when vacancies occurred in his mills. He further indicated that he would accept another investigation of conditions in the Standard plant to determine the need for arbitration. If a need were found, he would accept a board appointed by the governor or by the chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court. However, such a procedure would ignore the strikers and their grievances and thus preclude arbitration.

Moyer naturally rejected this scheme from Victor. MacNeill in turn rejected Mayor Franklin's counterproposal, endorsed by Moyer, for a three-man board consisting of one member selected by the Federation, one appointed by MacNeill or Governor Peabody, and the third chosen by the other two. This body would have power to settle all the issues.⁴⁵ Despite their efforts, the businessmen from Victor failed and the walkout began. Because some mineowners discontinued their shipments as requested, the strike order of March 17 involved less than eight hundred men working in mines obligated by contract to continue shipments to the USRRC.

MacNeill's intransigence was vital in spreading the strike. But the absence of negotiable differences with the mineowners and the apparent injustice of striking against mines legally obligated to ship ore or suffer heavy financial penalties aroused public indignation against the Federation. Many persons concluded that union leaders had arbitrarily called a "sympathetic strike." Moyer rejected this argument.⁴⁶

An enlarged strike now confronted the Governor. On March 19, he issued a proclamation creating an Advisory Board to investigate the causes of the strikes, the demands of the Federation, and the reasons for the stand of the USRRC. In addition to enlightening the Governor, the investigation was to convince the public that the administration was doing everything possible for both the "benefit of labor and the protection of capital."⁴⁷ The membership consisted of President William F. Slocum, Colorado College; Judge Charles D. Hayt, former member of the state Supreme Court; Republican Representative Frank Frewen of Teller County; and the Reverend Thomas A. Uzzell and Father Joseph P. Carrigan, Denver ministers who were interested in labor problems. President Slocum immediately asked to be relieved, and Peabody did not appoint a replacement. In

⁴² *Labor Disturbances*, p. 119.

⁴³ Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Ninth Biennial Report*, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁴ *Labor Disturbances*, p. 120.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 120-21.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁴⁷ Peabody to the Public, Peabody Papers: Executive Record Book XV, 179.

follow-up letters to board members, MacNeill, and Moyer, the Governor indicated that he had acted upon the advice of business and labor leaders.⁴⁸

Under the chairmanship of Judge Hayt, the board began its work in Denver on March 21, hearing first the testimony of Moyer. The labor leader blamed the strike upon the discriminatory policies of the USRRC and the discharge of union men from the Standard Mill solely because of their membership in the Federation.⁴⁹ Later, in response to interrogation by W. K. Babbitt, attorney for the USRRC, Moyer described the damaging effects of the Guard upon the strike. He claimed that the troops had not only helped the company secure strikebreakers but that they had also dispersed union pickets, making it impossible to "induce the men peacefully to discontinue work in the mills."⁵⁰

In his statement for the company, Babbitt indicated that the strike had originated in the Federation's efforts to dictate policy. He complained that union members intimidated, threatened, and assaulted nonunion workers until they feared for their lives, homes, and families. The company did not regard the strikers as employees. Their jobs had been taken by contented nonunion replacements who had been promised permanent employment as long as their service was satisfactory. In order for the strikers to return to work, they would have to reapply. Their applications would be processed along with others without discrimination when vacancies occurred. But there would be no immediate reinstatement. As for arbitration, Babbitt insisted that there was nothing to arbitrate, for the men then employed "were contented and anxious to remain in the employ of the company."⁵¹

The testimony of J. D. Hawkins, general superintendent of the USRRC, tended to verify Moyer's contention that the strike resulted from the discharge of men because they dared to join the union. Hawkins admitted that he had released some individuals because they were "agitators." Furthermore, he conceded that an employee's membership in the Mill and Smeltermen's Union was incompatible with company interests.⁵² However, MacNeill later denied any knowledge of Hawkins' discharge of men as "agitators" or because they were union mem-

⁴⁸ See Peabody to MacNeill, March 19, 1903, Peabody Papers: Letterpress Book 37. The other letters were identical to this one.

⁴⁹ Moyer to Advisory Board, March 21, 1903, "Report of Advisory Board."

⁵⁰ Moyer to Advisory Board, March 23, 1903, *ibid.*

⁵¹ Babbitt to Advisory Board, March 23, 1903, *ibid.*

⁵² Hawkins to Advisory Board, March 24, 1903, *ibid.*

bers prior to newspaper stories of the strike.⁵³ The probability of such inept coordination between key management officials is doubtful.

In a subsequent appearance before the board, MacNeill presented proposals for a settlement acceptable to the USRRC. His company would grant the eight-hour day except in the sampling department; it would not discriminate against union employees; it would re-employ the men on strike within sixty days; and it would meet with its employees or their representatives at any time.⁵⁴

Under questioning, MacNeill explained that he would meet with any committee only if all its members were employees. He agreed to receive a committee composed of union men, providing it represented the majority of his employees and consisted of employees. Nevertheless, he would not immediately recognize a *union* committee, even if composed of employees, because the majority of his nonunion employees were content. MacNeill refused Moyer's demand that he recognize the Mill and Smeltermen's Union and its committees whether or not they were composed of employees.⁵⁵

The principal obstacle to settlement remained the status of the strikers. The Federation pushed for their immediate reinstatement; the company refused because it would have to discharge their replacements. At the board's request Mayor Franklin of Victor stepped in with a solution. Speaking for the district businessmen, Franklin offered to find a job for any striker whom the USRRC could not re-employ within sixty days. Moyer rejected the offer, for some of the men owned homes and property in Colorado City and the district was more than forty miles away. Franklin then proposed that MacNeill discharge the strikebreakers, offering them the same guarantee of employment. MacNeill refused. Moyer countered with a compromise proposal that the company release only the single men employed as replacements. He argued that they were freer to move from Colorado City to the district. MacNeill rejected this as contrary to promises made to the men.⁵⁶


It was Moyer's concessions that finally led to a temporary settlement. He waived a demand for wage increases as well as

⁵³ MacNeill to Advisory Board, March 24, 1903, *ibid.*

⁵⁴ MacNeill to Advisory Board, March 28, 1903, *ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*



The mayor of Victor praised WFM President Charles Moyer's efforts to bring an end to the Colorado City strike.

demands that union committees submit all employee grievances to the company and that any agreement between the parties be formalized in writing (MacNeill had rejected written agreements because this would be tantamount to recognition of the Federation); he acquiesced in the mill official's absolute refusal to re-employ fourteen former union employees considered to be "obnoxious" or "agitators" by the company; and he accepted MacNeill's oral promise to reinstate all the strikers within sixty days and as fast as circumstances permitted.⁵⁷

Mayor Franklin recognized that Moyer's concessions had produced the settlement, for on March 31 he praised the union leader before the board by saying: "To thank you is not sufficient payment. You have averted what would have been probably the worst calamity that ever befell the state in your action today. . . ."⁵⁸

Moyer, however, had conceded reluctantly because he knew that MacNeill's proposals were subject to various interpretations and granted little but reinstatement of the men. Moreover, the agreement was unfair to the Portland and Telluride officials who had granted genuine concessions to the union at the Denver conference of March 14. He distrusted MacNeill, despite repeated assurances by the board that he was completely reliable. Nevertheless, Moyer was willing that the mill official have until May 18, the date of the Federation's executive board meeting prior to the annual convention of 1903, to justify the Advisory Board's faith in MacNeill's integrity. Before that date Moyer expected the company to reinstate the strikers to their old positions.⁵⁹ Reinstatement could be accomplished by shifting mill

personnel within the company's plants in Colorado City because its Colorado mill, which had been closed, was scheduled to re-open soon. But if MacNeill failed to fulfill his promises, the Federation's annual convention would be poised to force compliance.

Within twelve days, Governor Peabody's Advisory Board had found a formula for ending the strike by becoming, in effect, an arbitration board. The Governor had successfully side-stepped Moyer's desire for an arbitration board's having at least one member selected by the Federation when he appointed all the members without consulting Moyer, and publicly restricted them to investigative functions. Sensitive to public opinion, Moyer had acquiesced, only to find himself subtly pressured to negotiate by board members not of his choosing.⁶⁰ The result was an unwritten agreement protecting the interest of the USRRC. Nevertheless, members of the board praised the Governor for creating a "Peace Commission," which they considered an important innovation in Colorado's labor history.⁶¹ They suggested its further use if other industrial disputes developed.

The trouble still was not over in Colorado City. Disagreements soon occurred over the interpretation and the meaning of the terms "reinstate" and "re-employ," which had been used interchangeably in the pre-settlement discussions. Union leaders insisted that the agreement provided for reinstatement of the strikers to the exact positions held prior to the walkout. But company officials claimed that it meant nothing more than re-employing the strikers as jobs became available. Throughout April and early May the controversy persisted, preventing a complete settlement. MacNeill's refusal to consider a wage increase, like that granted by the Portland and Telluride mills on May 1, fostered more dissatisfaction. Conditions were precarious when the Advisory Board convened on May 23 to determine whether MacNeill had fulfilled his promises.

John Murphy, attorney for the Federation, focused upon the failure of the USRRC to reinstate the strikers to their former positions, and he questioned MacNeill's integrity because of his failure.⁶² This was a tactical error, for the members of the board

⁵⁷ *Labor Disturbances*, p. 127.

⁵⁸ Franklin to Advisory Board, March 31, 1903, "Report of Advisory Board."

⁵⁹ Moyer to Advisory Board, March 31, 1903, *ibid.*

⁶⁰ For examples, see the unanimous acceptance by members of the Advisory Board of MacNeill's reliability and integrity, plus their belief that he would fulfill all of his promises. Proceedings of the Advisory Board, March 28 to March 31, 1903, "Report of Advisory Board."

⁶¹ Report of the Advisory Board to Peabody, April 14, 1903, *ibid.*

⁶² Murphy to Advisory Board, May 23, 1903, "Second Report and Proceedings of Governor Peabody's Advisory Board," Peabody Papers: DB Correspondence.

had often expressed great confidence in MacNeill's character and were inclined to dismiss such allegations. Moreover, Babbitt, the attorney for the company, exploited the blunder, saying that peace was desirable but not at the price of surrendering "MacNeill's integrity before the people of Colorado."⁶³ The testimony of the two opposing lawyers created an early dilemma for the board, because whatever its decision, a renewal of the strike seemed certain.

Superintendent Hawkins presented a written statement which claimed that the USRRC had acted in good faith in offering to re-employ sixty of the seventy strikers. All the men, except those specifically excluded by the agreement, would have been offered jobs had there been sufficient ore to resume operations in the Colorado mill. But forty-seven of the strikers refused to work because the positions offered were not the same ones held on February 14. Satisfactory replacements filled those jobs and the company refused to discharge them. Furthermore, Hawkins' statement denied that any promise had been made to reinstate the strikers in their pre-strike positions.⁶⁴

Three days later, Charles R. Burr, an official of the Mill and Smeltermen's Union, submitted a statement explaining why his men refused to return to work. Some of them understood that reinstatement to their old jobs was basic to the agreement, but the old positions had not been tendered. Others refused because the company offered jobs formerly held by fellow strikers who had applied for reinstatement. A few men rejected their former jobs because the hours had been extended from eight to ten. Others refused because their new positions would have paid less than the old.⁶⁵ Murphy had also suggested earlier that many strikers refused employment because the company's procedures were designed to create dissension in the union.⁶⁶

In their report to Governor Peabody, board members opted in favor of MacNeill. They concluded that he had made "all possible efforts to re-employ the striking mill men" in conformity with his promise of March 31. Furthermore, he had "faithfully carried out" his pledge not to discriminate against union men when employing new personnel. In their opinion, MacNeill had done all that he had agreed to do.⁶⁷ Their conclusions placed

responsibility for the continuing unrest upon union leaders.

The precarious truce ended on July 3 when the Mill and Smeltermen's Union renewed its strike against the USRRC. Ironically, pressure upon the union from MacNeill's former colleagues was instrumental in forcing the issue. Peck and Fullerton, who had raised wages in their mills with the understanding that the Federation would have the USRRC follow suit, threatened a reduction to the old level unless MacNeill's company met their higher scale. The new strike was called to force wages up in the mills of the USRRC and to bring about reinstatement as interpreted by the union. Thus began a new phase of the dispute, which set the stage for the bitter "labor wars" of the Peabody Administration.

By early August Federation officials had reluctantly concluded that a full use of union power was necessary to force concessions from the USRRC. Numerous employers were rallying to the anti-union crusade of the Citizens' Alliance movement then sweeping over Colorado, and experience indicated that Governor Peabody would use the power of the state in behalf of the employers if a showdown came. On August 8, therefore, Federation officials from the Cripple Creek district conferred with MacNeill in a final attempt to reach a settlement before again committing the miners to the struggle. They failed. With every means exhausted except force, District Union No. 1 ordered all but a few of its members out of the mines, hoping to block ore shipments to the mills of the USRRC.

Union expectations that the mineowners and businessmen of the district would pressure the USRRC to concede the millworkers' demands so that mining might resume were not realized. The Mine Owners' Association responded to the miners' strike by announcing that, in the absence of negotiable differences, its members would immediately hire replacements for the strikers. And district businessmen, who earlier had worked diligently to resolve the Colorado City problem, supported the mineowners by discontinuing credit to the striking miners. To feed its members, the Federation set up cooperative stores, further alienating the business community. These developments gave the strike new dimensions by linking the USRRC and district employers in common opposition to the union. Incidents inevitably occurred as the Federation tried to halt production and the mineowners attempted to resume operations. On September 4 Governor Peabody joined the growing anti-Federation

⁶³ Babbitt to Advisory Board, May 23, 1903, *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Exhibit 1 (USRRC), Hawkins to Hayt, May 23, 1903, *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Exhibit 2 (WFM), Burr to Advisory Board, May 26, 1903, *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Murphy to Advisory Board, May 23, 1903, *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Report of Advisory Board to Peabody, May 31, 1903, *ibid.*

coalition by ordering hundreds of troops into the district at the mineowners' request.

Thereafter the entire state knew no peace as units of the National Guard moved into other mining camps to curb the growing labor unrest and anticipated violence. Strongly supported by Governor Peabody, the organized employers were determined to end once and for all the growing power of the Federation to influence the political and economic life of Colorado. Soon the strike of the Mill and Smeltermen's Union against the USRRC was forgotten in the drama of attempted train wrecks, mine "accidents," military violations of civil liberties, dynamite murder, wholesale deportation of striking miners, and martial law in the Cripple Creek and other mining districts of the state. Ultimately, the calamitous "labor wars" of the Peabody years broke the power of the Western Federation of Miners and, in doing so, altered the industrial history of Colorado and the West. The Colorado City strike, which set off the bitter struggle between capital and labor, helped to produce this turning point, for had a settlement acceptable to all parties been reached early in 1903, the energies of the Peabody Administration might have been diverted to more peaceful and constructive channels.

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